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Segunda-feira, 13 de maio de 2024 II Série-D — Número 4
XVI LEGISLATURA 1.ª SESSÃO LEGISLATIVA (2024-2025)
S U M Á R I O
Delegação da Assembleia da República:
Relatório da participação da Assembleia da República na 2.ª Parte da Sessão Plenária de 2024 da Assembleia Parlamentar do Conselho da Europa (APCE), que teve lugar em Estrasburgo, de 15 a 19 de abril de 2024.
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DELEGAÇÃO DA ASSEMBLEIA DA REPÚBLICA
RELATÓRIO DA PARTICIPAÇÃO DA ASSEMBLEIA DA REPÚBLICA NA 2.ª PARTE DA SESSÃO
PLENÁRIA DE 2024 DA ASSEMBLEIA PARLAMENTAR DO CONSELHO DA EUROPA (APCE), QUE TEVE
LUGAR EM ESTRASBURGO, DE 15 A 19 DE ABRIL DE 2024
SESSÃO DA PRIMAVERA 2024
A 2.ª Parte da Sessão Plenária de 2024 da Assembleia Parlamentar do Conselho da Europa (APCE) teve
lugar em Estrasburgo, no hemiciclo do Parlamento Europeu, de 15 a 19 de abril. Participaram, por parte da
Delegação Portuguesa, a Deputada Edite Estrela (PS), Presidente, o Deputado Paulo Pisco (PS) e o Deputado
Paulo Moniz (PSD). Tiveram ainda lugar reuniões do Bureau, das comissões e subcomissões e dos diversos
grupos políticos.
A agendada Sessão da Primavera da APCE teve como um dos pontos altos um debate de urgência sobre
«a morte de Alexei Navalny e a necessidade de contrariar o regime totalitário de Vladimir Putin e a sua guerra
contra a democracia». O relatório sobre «a detenção arbitrária de Vladimir Kara-Murza e a perseguição
sistemática de manifestantes antiguerra na Federação Russa e na Bielorrússia» e o relatório que propõe
sanções específicas contra os envolvidos na detenção, condenação e envenenamento de Vladimir Kara-Murza
foram objeto de um debate conjunto. Ainda sobre este assunto, a Assembleia debateu o apoio à reconstrução
da Ucrânia, incluindo uma proposta de utilização de ativos estatais russos congelados para este fim, com a
participação da Presidente da Verkhovna Radada Ucrânia, Ruslan Stefanchuk.
A Assembleia adotou ainda o seu parecer estatutário sobre o pedido de adesão do Kosovo ao Conselho da
Europa.
Tiveram ainda lugar um debate de urgência sobre o «Projeto de Convenção-Quadro sobre Inteligência
Artificial, Direitos Humanos, Democracia e Estado de Direito», bem como um debate de atualidade sobre como
«Responder à catástrofe humanitária em Gaza e evitar novas escaladas no Médio Oriente na sequência do
recente ataque iraniano contra Israel».
Da agenda da sessão constaram ainda as intervenções de S. A. S. o Príncipe Herdeiro Alois von und zu
Liechtenstein e do Vice-Primeiro-Ministro e Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros da República da Moldova,
Mihail Popşoi.
A Ministra dos Negócios Estrangeiros, da Educação e dos Desportos do Liechtenstein, Dominique Hasler,
apresentou uma comunicação do Comité de Ministros no contexto da Presidência do Liechtenstein do
Conselho da Europa. A Secretária-Geral do Conselho da Europa, Marija Pejčinovic Burić, fez uma intervenção
seguida do habitual período de perguntas.
De referir ainda a eleição de juízes do Tribunal Europeu dos Direitos Humanos, em representação da
Irlanda, Letónia e Liechtenstein.
Os debates focaram também a liberdade de expressão e de reunião das pessoas LGBTI na Europa, tendo
ainda tido lugar um debate conjunto sobre «a concretização do direito humano a um ambiente seguro, limpo,
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saudável e sustentável» e as «estratégias do Conselho da Europa para mares e oceanos saudáveis», no
âmbito do qual a Deputada Edite Estrela (PS) fez uma intervenção.
Os parlamentares debateram ainda a proteção das crianças contra a violência em linha, a relação entre
maioria e oposição em democracia e as melhores práticas em matéria de referendos, sendo este último da
autoria da antiga Deputada Isabel Meireles, relatora da Comissão de Assuntos Políticos e Democracia.
Por fim, a Assembleia debateu as propostas de encerramento do processo de acompanhamento relativo à
Albânia e do diálogo pós-acompanhamento com a Bulgária.
Abertura da Sessão Plenária
Na sua intervenção na Sessão de Abertura, no dia 15 de abril, o Presidente da Assembleia Parlamentar,
Theodoros Rousopoulos, afirmou que «A Ucrânia precisa do nosso apoio e não apenas de palavras - precisa
agora das munições vitais que lhe permitirão continuar a defender-se, a defender-nos a todos e a defender o
direito mais fundamental de todos, estabelecido na Convenção Europeia dos Direitos do Humanos - o direito
das pessoas à vida». O Presidente apelou ainda a todos os países europeus para que dupliquem e tripliquem
os seus esforços para permitir à Ucrânia repelir o invasor, recuperar o controlo sobre os seus territórios
ilegalmente ocupados e restaurar a paz baseada na justiça em todo o seu território. Seguiu-se 1 minuto de
silêncio por todas as vítimas da agressão russa contra a Ucrânia.
O Presidente referiu ainda que no dia seguinte a Assembleia iria debater o apoio à reconstrução da
Ucrânia, incluindo uma proposta de utilização de ativos estatais russos congelados para este fim, com a
participação do Presidente da Verkhovna Rada da Ucrânia, Ruslan Stefanchuk.
Antes do debate conjunto agendado para quarta-feira sobre a morte de Alexei Navalny e a detenção
arbitrária de Vladimir Kara-Murza, o Presidente da APCE prestou homenagem «a outros líderes políticos da
oposição e prisioneiros, e a todos os cidadãos russos comuns que têm a coragem de desafiar o regime
repressivo de Vladimir Putin».
O Presidente mencionou ainda a situação no Médio Oriente e a «terrível tragédia humana que se desenrola
perante os nossos olhos na nossa vizinhança», bem como o debate de atualidade que iria ter lugar sobre o
tema. Em nome da Assembleia, o Presidente deu ainda as boas-vindas ao Knesset israelita e à Assembleia
Nacional Palestiniana como convidados e parceiros valiosos no hemiciclo e frisou que «Temos o nosso papel
a desempenhar, juntando a nossa voz aos apelos a uma solução sustentável e pacífica no Médio Oriente».
Da Ordem de Trabalhos (Anexo 1), destaca-se a apresentação e debate de relatórios das comissões,tendo
sido aprovados os seguintes documentos (Anexo 2):
Pareceres
Opinion 302 (2024) Application by Kosovo* for membership of the Council of Europe (Doc. 15958) * Throughout this text, all reference to Kosovo, whether to the territory, institutions or populationshall be understood in full compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 andwithout prejudice to the status of Kosovo.
Opinion 303 (2024) Draft Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence, Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law (Doc. 15971)
Recomendações
Recommendation 2271 (2024) Support for the reconstruction of Ukraine (Doc. 15932)
Recommendation 2272 (2024) Mainstreaming the human right to a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment with the Reykjavik process (Doc. 15955)
Recommendation 2273 (2024) Towards Council of Europe strategies for healthy seas and oceans to counter the climate crisis (Doc. 15956)
Recommendation 2274 (2024) The protection of children against online violence (Doc. 15954)
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Resoluções
Resolution 2537 (2024) Relationship between the parliamentary majority and the opposition in a democracy (Doc. 15946)
Resolution 2538 (2024) Promoting the revised Code of Good Practice on Referendums (Doc. 15940)
Resolution 2539 (2024) Support for the reconstruction of Ukraine (Doc. 15932)
Resolution 2540 (2024) Alexei Navalny's death and the need to counter Vladimir Putin's totalitarian regime and its war on democracy (Doc. 15966)
Resolution 2541 (2024) The arbitrary detention of Vladimir Kara-Murza and the systematic persecution of anti-war protesters in the Russian Federation and Belarus (Doc. 15967)
Resolution 2542 (2024) Sanctions against persons on the «Kara-Murza list» (Doc. 15939)
Resolution 2543 (2024) Freedom of expression and assembly of LGBTI people in Europe (Doc. 15953)
Resolution 2544 (2024) The honouring of obligations and commitments by Albania (Doc. 15950)
Resolution 2545 (2024) Mainstreaming the human right to a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment with the Reykjavik process (Doc. 15955)
Resolution 2546 (2024) Towards Council of Europe strategies for healthy seas and oceans to counter the climate crisis (Doc. 15956)
Resolution 2547 (2024) The protection of children against online violence (Doc. 15954)
De salientar os seguintes debates:
Debate conjunto
No dia 15 de abril, teve lugar o debate conjunto dos Relatórios da Comissão de Assuntos Políticos e
Democracia sobre a Relação entre a maioria parlamentar e a oposição numa democracia (Doc. 15946), da
relatora Elvira Kovács (Sérvia, PPE/DC) e o Código Revisto de Boas Práticas sobre Referendos (Doc. 15940),
da relatora Isabel Meireles (Portugal, PPE/DC), apresentado pela Deputada Elvira Kovács, em nome da antiga
Deputada Isabel Meireles.
No primeiro debate, a Assembleia Parlamentar saudou a elaboração dos parâmetros da lista de controlo da
Comissão de Veneza sobre a relação entre a maioria parlamentar e a oposição numa democracia e
recomendou-a aos Parlamentos dos Estados-membros do Conselho da Europa e dos Estados observadores,
bem como aos Parlamentos que beneficiam do estatuto de parceiros para a democracia.
Os membros da APCE salientaram que esta lista de controlo é o resultado de um trabalho cuidadoso
levado a cabo pela Comissão de Veneza, que teve origem na Resolução 1601 (2008), intitulada Orientações
processuais sobre os direitos e responsabilidades da oposição num parlamento democrático.
Por último, a Assembleia Parlamentar propôs que os grupos políticos da APCE revejam os seus estatutos e
regulamentos internos, incluindo as disposições que especificam o procedimento, os requisitos e as
consequências das mudanças de filiação política, bem como a suspensão, expulsão ou demissão de
membros.
A Resolução aprovada convida os Parlamentos dos Estados-membros a promoverem os parâmetros da
lista de controlo da Comissão de Veneza e a tê-los em conta na revisão dos regulamentos nacionais sobre a
relação entre a maioria parlamentar e a oposição.
Durante o debate do segundo relatório, os membros da APCE sublinharam a necessidade de atualizar as
orientações para garantir a realização de referendos justos. Reconhecendo que os referendos nacionais
recentes foram objeto de um escrutínio sobre o processo e a equidade, a APCE colaborou de forma proativa
com a Comissão de Veneza para dar resposta a estas preocupações.
A Assembleia destacou que o Código Revisto não impõe os referendos como solução universal nem dita a
sua frequência ou âmbito. Em vez disso, fornece orientações essenciais para assegurar que os referendos
refletem verdadeiramente os desejos do eleitorado, respeitando simultaneamente as normas internacionais.
Embora se centre principalmente nos referendos nacionais, o Código Revisto é «adaptado à realidade dos
referendos locais e regionais, em conformidade com as tradições constitucionais nacionais».
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A Assembleia apelou aos Estados-membros para que divulguem e incorporem as diretrizes nos seus
quadros nacionais, promovendo «o diálogo sobre a forma de melhorar as regras nacionais existentes em
matéria de referendos». Os parlamentares instaram os Parlamentos dos Estados-membros do Conselho da
Europa a reverem as suas regras de referendo de acordo com o Código Revisto para melhorar o ambiente
jurídico e institucional do referendo.
A Assembleia está igualmente determinada em desempenhar um papel mais ativo na promoção do Código,
por exemplo, incentivando os debates no seio dos grupos políticos para melhorar o quadro jurídico dos
referendos. Propõe-se igualmente a realização de debates sobre o desenvolvimento das melhores práticas, a
intensificação das atividades de cooperação interparlamentar e a colaboração com a Comissão de Veneza
para rever e, eventualmente, melhorar o Código Revisto, conforme necessário. A Resolução foi adotada por
unanimidade.
«Pedido de adesão do Kosovo1 ao Conselho da Europa» (Doc. 15958)
A Assembleia Parlamentar do Conselho da Europa recomendou que o Kosovo1 fosse convidado a tornar-se
membro do Conselho da Europa, decidindo simultaneamente acompanhar o cumprimento de uma extensa
lista de compromissos e obrigações a partir da sua adesão.
De acordo com os procedimentos do Conselho da Europa, a Assembleia deve emitir o seu parecer sobre
qualquer pedido de adesão antes de ser tomada uma decisão final pelo Comité de Ministros, o órgão executivo
da organização composto pelos Ministros dos Negócios Estrangeiros.
No Parecer adotado, com base num Relatório da Deputada Dora Bakoyannis (Grécia, PPE/DC) e aprovado
por 131 votos a favor, 29 contra e 11 abstenções, a Assembleia afirmou que a adesão conduziria ao «reforço
das normas em matéria de direitos humanos, garantindo o acesso ao Tribunal Europeu dos Direitos Humanos
a todos aqueles que se encontram sob a jurisdição do Kosovo».
Os Deputados salientaram que a adesão ajudaria também o Kosovo a «enfrentar os desafios pendentes e
as questões preocupantes», incluindo o fosso entre os padrões normativos e a sua aplicação efetiva, a
necessidade de proteger melhor os direitos das comunidades não maioritárias e a promoção de um clima
propício à confiança, à reconciliação e à inclusão.
A Assembleia saudou como «um grande avanço» a implementação do acórdão do Tribunal Constitucional
no caso do mosteiro Visoki Dečani, que considerou ser «um sinal tangível do compromisso do Governo em
agir em plena conformidade com o Estado de direito, independentemente de considerações políticas» e
acrescentou que a criação de uma associação de municípios de maioria sérvia seria «um passo importante»
para garantir a proteção dos direitos dos sérvios do Kosovo, e «deveria constar da futura análise do Comité de
Ministros sobre o pedido de adesão do Kosovo ao Conselho da Europa, como um compromisso pós-adesão».
Reconhecendo as «circunstâncias sem precedentes» do pedido, dado que vários Estados-membros do
Conselho da Europa não reconhecem o Kosovo como um Estado, a Assembleia apelou à «diplomacia, ao
diálogo e ao compromisso». Convidou o Comité de Ministros a garantir que a adesão do Kosovo «não
prejudica as posições individuais dos Estados-membros no que diz respeito ao estatuto de Estado do
Kosovo».
Debate conjunto (18 de abril)
No dia 18 de abril, realizou-se o debate conjunto dos Relatórios da Comissão de Assuntos Sociais, Saúde e
Desenvolvimento Sustentável: Integrar o direito humano a um ambiente seguro, limpo, saudável e sustentável
no processo de Reiquiavique (Doc. 15955), do relator Simon Moutquin (Bélgica, SOC); e Rumo a estratégias
do Conselho da Europa para mares e oceanos saudáveis para combater a crise climática (Doc. 15956), da
relatora Yuliia Ovchynnykova (Ucrânia, ALDE).
Durante o debate, os membros da APCE lamentaram o facto de o Conselho da Europa ser atualmente o
único sistema regional de direitos humanos que ainda não reconheceu formalmente o direito a um ambiente
1 Ao longo do presente texto, todas as referências ao Kosovo, quer se trate do território, das instituições ou da população, devem ser entendidas em plena conformidade com a Resolução 1244 do Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas e sem prejuízo do estatuto do Kosovo.
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saudável e recordaram que, na 4.ª Cimeira do Conselho da Europa, em Reiquiavique (16-17 de maio de
2023), os Chefes de Estado e de Governo tinham reconhecido a urgência de proteger o ambiente e de
combater o impacto da «tripla crise planetária da poluição, das alterações climáticas e da perda de
biodiversidade».
A Assembleia Parlamentar declarou que esta futura estratégia deve ter um objetivo claro em termos de
estabelecimento de normas a nível europeu e sublinhou a importância de «elaborar um instrumento
juridicamente vinculativo que reconheça um direito autónomo a um ambiente saudável no âmbito do Conselho
da Europa», tirando partido das normas existentes.
Neste contexto, a APCE convidou os Estados-membros a refletirem, a nível nacional, sobre a natureza e o
conteúdo do direito a um ambiente saudável, de modo que este direito seja rapidamente reconhecido na lei
como um direito humano autónomo. A Resolução adotada incentiva igualmente a criação de equipas
ambientais especializadas em todos os ramos da governação, bem como a introdução de mecanismos de
participação dos cidadãos a nível nacional para promover a aceitação social das políticas ambientais, em
especial pelos e para os jovens e congratula-se com a criação, em janeiro de 2024, de uma task force
intersecretariado para o ambiente, encarregada de efetuar um levantamento das atividades existentes e
previstas e de «propor elementos para o desenvolvimento de uma primeira estratégia do Conselho da Europa
para o ambiente».
Por último, a Assembleia Parlamentar recomendou que o Comité de Ministros desse prioridade à criação
de um «Comité intergovernamental ad hoc para organizar, coordenar e gerir a aplicação da estratégia e do
plano de ação» e à elaboração de um «instrumento jurídico vinculativo o mais rapidamente possível».
A Deputada Edite Estrela (PS), participou no debate com a seguinte intervenção:
Thank you, Chairman.
I start by thanking Mr Simon Moutquin and Ms Yuliia Ovchynnykova for their
excellent, timely and inspiring reports which contribute to the implementation of the
Reykjavìk process through concrete and realistic proposals.
The report highlights the urgent need to formalise the right to a healthy
environment within the Council of Europe.
The right to a healthy environment should be recognised in law as an autonomous
human right in each member state. At the Council of Europe level, this right can be
achieved through an additional protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights or an autonomous
convention.
Due to its history and its objectives, our Assembly must be an example for the world in defending
fundamental rights. We must be ambitious.
In my report on climate crisis and rule of law approved by this Assembly in 2021, I proposed to create a
network of contact parliamentarians for a healthy environment, that represents an important step towards
involving parliamentarians in defending a healthy environment.
We were ambitious and we are now working together for a healthy environment.
The report stresses the importance of capitalising on existing Council of Europe standards and developing
strategic environmental governance, including a special intergovernmental committee and a monitoring
mechanism. It calls for concrete and concerted action to prevent the Council of Europe from losing its credibility
in environmental action.
Dear colleagues, do you know that it has been more than 15 years since Al Gore, former Vice President of
the US, and Nobel Peace Prize winner, alerted the world to «An Inconvenient Truth» and warned us that
climate change threatens future generations?
The most inconvenient truth is that we are doing too little and too slowly, and if we continue down this path,
we could finish, not with the planet, but with life on Earth.
Experts claim that the climate crisis threatens all the progress made after the Second World War.
The Reykjavìk Declaration is clear: it highlights the urgency of additional efforts to protect the environment,
as well as to combat the impact of pollution, climate change and biodiversity loss on human rights, democracy,
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and the rule of law.
Human Rights are at stake.
The first of these is the right to survival.
The right of young people to a future.
This is up to me. This is up to you. This is up to us.
Thank you very much.
Debate de urgência
Projeto de Convenção-Quadro sobre a Inteligência Artificial, os Direitos Humanos, a Democracia e o
Estado de Direito (Doc. 15951), a 18 de abril.
Os membros da APCE acolheram calorosamente a finalização do projeto de Convenção-Quadro sobre
Inteligência Artificial, Direitos Humanos, Democracia e Estado de Direito, elaborado no âmbito do Conselho da
Europa, mas lamentaram que «não abranja de igual forma os atores públicos e privados».
De acordo com o procedimento de elaboração de um tratado do Conselho da Europa, a Assembleia deve
emitir o seu parecer antes da sua adoção pelo órgão executivo da organização, o Comité de Ministros. Será o
primeiro tratado internacional de sempre sobre a IA, aberto a todos os Estados do mundo, no qual os Estados
que o ratificarem deverão basear as suas legislações nacionais.
Ao aprovar por unanimidade o seu Parecer, com base num relatório da Deputada Thórhildur Sunna
Ævarsdóttir (SOC Islândia), a Assembleia afirmou: «Muitos sistemas de IA são desenvolvidos e implantados
por entidades privadas, e a introdução de uma abordagem diferenciada para o sector privado cria uma lacuna
significativa».
Apelou veementemente a todos os Estados-membros do Conselho da Europa para que, ao ratificarem a
Convenção, optem por aplicar plenamente as suas disposições às atividades dos agentes privados, esperando
que uma interpretação dinâmica das disposições da Convenção por parte da Conferência das Partes, o seu
mecanismo de supervisão, «promova avanços ao longo do tempo, através de requisitos de informação e da
pressão dos pares».
A Assembleia propôs várias alterações ao projeto de convenção. As restrições à sua aplicação às
atividades de IA necessárias para proteger a «segurança nacional ou os interesses da defesa nacional» só
devem ser possíveis se essas atividades estiverem em conformidade com o direito internacional em matéria
de direitos humanos. Os Estados devem também impor limitações, ou mesmo proibições, a determinadas
utilizações da IA consideradas incompatíveis com os direitos humanos. Os Deputados propuseram ainda a
inserção de uma disposição específica sobre saúde e ambiente.
A Convenção – que deverá ser adotada pelo Comité de Ministros antes de ser aberta à assinatura e à
ratificação – foi negociada por representantes dos Estados-membros do Conselho da Europa, da UE e de
Estados não europeus, como os EUA, o Japão, o Canadá, o México, Israel, a Argentina, a Austrália, a Costa
Rica, o Peru e o Uruguai.
Debate de atualidade
O debate «Resposta à catástrofe humanitária em Gaza e a prevenção de novas escaladas no Médio
Oriente, na sequência do recente ataque iraniano contra Israel», foi aberto por Andrej Hunko (Alemanha, UEL).
O debate teve lugar no dia 18 de abril e contou com a participação de 35 oradores.
De referir ainda:
Apresentação e discussão do Relatório de Atividades do Bureau e da Comissão Permanente, pela
Deputada Petra Bayr (Áustria, SOC), (Doc. 15959), a 15 de abril. Este relatório analisa os trabalhos e as
decisões dos órgãos subsidiários da Assembleia desde a última sessão. Alguns dos pontos focados no
presente relatório foram o seguimento da Cimeira de Reiquiavique, as listas de candidatos a juízes do Tribunal
Europeu dos Direitos Humanos, apresentadas pela Áustria, Irlanda, Letónia, Liechtenstein e Mónaco, o Prémio
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Vigdís 2024 para o Empoderamento das Mulheres e a observação das eleições presidenciais e parlamentares
na Macedónia do Norte (24 de abril e 8 de maio de 2024) e das eleições parlamentares antecipadas na
Bulgária (9 de junho de 2024).
Eleição de juízes do Tribunal Europeu dos Direitos Humanos (TEDH), em representação da Irlanda, da
Letónia e do Liechtenstein, nos dias 16 e 17 de abril. A Juíza Úna Ní Raifeartaigh (Irlanda), o Juiz Artūrs Kučs
(Letónia) e o Juiz Alain Chablais (Liechtenstein) foram eleitos por maioria absoluta dos votos expressos. Os
respetivos mandatos de nove anos terão início até três meses após a sua eleição. Os juízes do TEDH são
eleitos pela Assembleia Parlamentar, a partir de uma lista de três candidatos de cada Estado que ratificou a
Convenção Europeia dos Direitos Humanos.
Women@PACE
No dia 16 de abril, a Deputada Edite Estrela participou na reunião do grupo Women@PACE. Nesta reunião,
conjunta com o Relator Geral para a Democracia da APCE, Deputado George Papandreou, teve lugar uma
troca de pontos de vista, que abrangeu a perspetiva das mulheres, sobre Repensar a democracia: governação
participativa, governação eletrónica e o papel da IA, com a participação do Professor Byong-jin Ahn, da
Academia Global para as Civilizações do Futuro, da Universidade Kyung Hee, Seul, do Professor de Sistemas
Inteligentes e Auto-Organizáveis, Jeremy Pitt, do Imperial College, Londres, e do Professor de Estudos da
Internet, Philip Howard, da Universidade de Oxford, e ainda da Deputada Thórhildur Sunna Ævarsdóttir,
Membro da APCE (Islândia, SOC).
Comissões, Subcomissões e Redes Parlamentares
Os membros da Delegação participaram nas seguintes reuniões das respetivas comissões e
subcomissões:
Comissão de Assuntos Políticos e Democracia – Deputada Edite Estrela (PS) e Deputado Paulo Moniz
(PSD), nos dias 15 e 18 de abril.
Comissão de Assuntos Sociais, Saúde e Desenvolvimento Sustentável
Rede de Parlamentares de Referência por um Ambiente
Saudável – Sob a presidência da Deputada Edite Estrela (PS), no
dia 17 de abril, decorreu uma audição sobre A jurisprudência do
Tribunal Europeu dos Direitos Humanos em matéria de ambiente e
a tónica nos resultados dos processos relativos ao clima. Após a
apresentação de Natalia Kobylarz, Consultora jurídica sénior da
Secretaria do Tribunal Europeu dos Direitos Humanos teve lugar
uma troca de pontos de vista com os membros da Rede.
Comissão de Migrações, Refugiados e Deslocados Internos – Deputado Paulo Pisco (PS), no dia 16 de
abril.
O Deputado Paulo Pisco foi designado por unanimidade relator sobre Salvar vidas de migrantes no
Mediterrâneo e respeitar os seus direitos humanos. Na apresentação dos argumentos para a elaboração do
relatório, o Deputado Paulo Pisco considerou que a tragédia das mortes no Mediterrâneo continua a ser um
tema de atualidade devido a um conjunto de falhas e disfuncionamentos que se verificam no processo
migratório, na aplicação do quadro legislativo nacional e internacional e na eficácia com que este fenómeno é
encarado e combatido, bem como no que se refere à persistente violação dos direitos fundamentais.
Com efeito, milhares de pessoas continuam a deixar os seus países devido à guerra, perseguições e
pobreza, procurando uma vida digna, expondo-se a inúmeros perigos, muitas vezes arriscando a vida com
consequências trágicas, como se verifica pelo número de mortes por afogamento de homens, mulheres e
crianças no Mediterrâneo.
O ano de 2023 foi ainda mais dramático do que 2022, tendo morrido ou desaparecido no Mediterrâneo até
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9
novembro do ano passado pelo menos 2480 migrantes. Por outro lado, verifica-se igualmente que, ao longo
dos percursos migratórios, os migrantes são expostos a todo o tipo de violação de direitos humanos, em
termos de proteção, períodos de detenção em centros de acolhimento e condições de existência.
Estas situações ocorrem devido a um conjunto de fatores, como o a atividade criminosa dos traficantes, as
falhas nos sistemas de vigilância nas áreas costeiras e nos obstáculos por vezes existentes às operações de
salvamento, a insuficiente solidariedade entre Estados-Membros da União Europeia e do Conselho da Europa,
bem como, em alguns casos, a falta de condições e violação dos direitos fundamentais nos países de chegada
e acolhimento.
Neste contexto, é importante identificar os pontos onde existem falhas no processo de controlo migratório,
no combate aos traficantes de migrantes, na aplicação das leis que protegem os direitos fundamentais dos
migrantes, na ação de organizações não governamentais vocacionadas para o apoio e salvamento de
migrantes no Mediterrâneo e nos constrangimentos quanto a meios de busca e salvamento oficiais,
designadamente no âmbito da vigilância de fronteiras e operações de busca e salvamento no mar.
O Deputado Paulo Pisco foi também indicado para integrar a subcomissão ad hoc constituída e um grupo
de dez parlamentares da APCE para efetuar uma visita à Sicília para recolha de informação sobre as
condições nos centros de acolhimento para migrantes.
Comissão de Cultura, Ciência, Educação e Media – Deputada Edite Estrela (PS) e Deputado Paulo
Moniz (PSD), nos dias 16 e 18 de abril.
A Comissão tomou conhecimento da nomeação da Deputada Edite Estrela, na sua qualidade de
Representante da Comissão no Centro Norte-Sul, para participar na 30.ª Reunião do Comité Executivo do
Centro Norte-Sul, que terá lugar em Lisboa, no dia 21 de maio de 2024.
Reunião conjunta da Comissão de Cultura, Ciência, Educação e Media e da Comissão de Assuntos
Sociais, Saúde e Desenvolvimento Sustentável, no dia 18 de abril.
Teve lugar uma troca de pontos de vista sobre o Centro Norte-Sul com a
Embaixadora Francesca Camilleri Vettiger, Representante Permanente de
Malta, Presidente do Comité Executivo do Centro Norte-Sul do Conselho da
Europa.
Após a intervenção da Embaixadora Francesca Camilleri Vettiger, a
Deputada Edite Estrela colocou a seguinte questão:
I am the institutional representative of the Committee on Culture, Science,
Education and Media to the North-South Centre. I am also a member of the
Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy, which unfortunately could not
join this meeting.
I would like to say that we warmly welcome the new phase of the South Programme and we value the
contribution that the North-South Centre, also through this programme, could bring to the reinforcement of
human rights and democratic governance in the Southern Mediterranean region.
However, when we discuss democratic governance, the parliamentary dimension should be present. And
our feeling is that unfortunately, the South Programme V does not pay adequate attention to this dimension, as
it seems that no resources have been allocated to interparliamentary cooperation.
This also reduces the possibility for PACE to work together with the North-South Centre and to strengthen
the role of parliaments in this region.
I believe that a stronger parliamentary dimension of the cooperation in the South Mediterranean region and
in the South Programme is needed to build a common legal space, as parliaments are the constitutional bodies
entrusted with legislation reforms.
My question to you, Ambassador Camilleri, is the following: do you believe that when designing your
concrete activities within the framework of the South Programme V, especially in the areas where PACE is
particularly active, such as combatting violence against women, ensuring protection of children or promoting
freedom of expression, you can somewhat correct this and find a way to get parliaments involved, namely
whilst implementing regional activities to which PACE might wish to contribute?
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II SÉRIE-D — NÚMERO 4
10
Thank you.
A Embaixadora referiu os esforços já envidados na implementação da Convenção de Istambul de forma a
garantir a segurança das mulheres e a ajudar a prevenir as muitas formas de violência com base no género,
salientando que todos os Estados devem fazer tudo o que estiver ao seu alcance para aplicar na prática as
normas da Convenção. Manifestou ainda a sua preocupação com o problema do tráfico de seres humanos e a
necessidade de o identificar e referenciar. Referiu ainda os seus receios relativamente ao impacto das
alterações climáticas e ao aumento do discurso do ódio e da homofobia. Transmitiu também a intenção de
alternar o Fórum de Lisboa com uma Conferência do Centro Norte-Sul para fomentar o diálogo intercultural.
Comissão da Igualdade e da Não Discriminação – Deputada Edite Estrela (PS), nos dias 15 e 16 de
abril.
Os membros da Comissão ouviram uma apresentação da nova Estratégia para a Igualdade de Género, por
Ralph Kass, Presidente da Comissão para a Igualdade de Género do Conselho da Europa (GEC).
Comissão para o Respeito das Obrigações e Deveres dos Estados-membros do Conselho da Europa
(Suivi / Monitoring) – Deputada Edite Estrela (PS), nos dias 16, 17 e 18 de abril.
Na reunião de 16 de abril, no âmbito do relatório sobre O cumprimento das obrigações e dos compromissos
assumidos pela Geórgia, os membros da Comissão ouviram uma declaração dos correlatores, Deputada Edite
Estrela (Portugal, SOC) e Deputado Claude Kern (França, ALDE), e acordaram em solicitar à Comissão
Europeia para a Democracia pelo Direito (Comissão de Veneza) dois pareceres sobre as recentes alterações
ao código eleitoral da Geórgia que suprime as quotas de género, tal como adotadas pelo Parlamento
georgiano em 4 de abril de 2024, e sobre os projetos de lei constitucional sobre a «proteção dos valores
familiares e dos menores».
Grupos políticos
Os vários membros da Delegação participaram nas reuniões dos diversos grupos políticos da Assembleia
Parlamentar, nos dias 15 e 17 de abril.
Encontros
• No dia 15 de abril, a Deputada Edite Estrela teve uma reunião com o Deputado Claude Kern, correlator
sobre a Geórgia, no âmbito do relatório sobre O cumprimento das obrigações e dos compromissos assumidos
pela Geórgia e o Assessor da Comissão de Monitoring, Bas Klein.
• No dia 16 de abril, a Deputada Edite Estrela reuniu-se com a nova Chefe do Secretariado da Comissão
de Assuntos Sociais, Saúde e Desenvolvimento Sustentável, onde foram abordadas algumas das temáticas
futuras relacionadas com a Rede de Parlamentares de Referência por um Ambiente Saudável,à qual preside.
• No dia 19 de abril, a Presidente da Delegação, Deputada Edite Estrela, teve um encontro com o
candidato belga ao cargo de Secretário-Geral do Conselho da Europa, Didier Reynders, que apresentou as
motivações da sua candidatura e as prioridades do seu programa:
– Mobilizar o espírito de Reiquiavique e assegurar a execução das decisões adotadas;
– Manter a integridade e a credibilidade do sistema e assegurar a pertinência dos instrumentos do
Conselho da Europa para fazer face a novos desafios;
– Melhorar a proximidade do Conselho da Europa com as dinâmicas de base e os cidadãos;
– Reforçar a influência e a presença internacional da organização.
O candidato Didier Reynders referiu ainda que a celebração do 75.º aniversário da organização será uma
oportunidade única para realçar as suas realizações concretas e o seu impacto fundamental na vida dos seus
cidadãos, num momento em que a Europa está a enfrentar desafios extraordinários, que culminam na
agressão da Rússia contra a Ucrânia.
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A eleição deverá ocorrer durante a Sessão Plenária de junho do corrente ano (24-28 junho).
Reunião de Secretários das Delegações Nacionais
A reunião com a Secretária-Geral da APCE, Despina Chatzivassiliou-Tsovilis, que habitualmente antecede
a Sessão Plenária, teve lugar no dia 15 de abril, destacando-se da Ordem de Trabalhos os seguintes pontos:
• Apresentação do projeto de Ordem de Trabalhos da 2.ª Parte da Sessão Plenária de 2024
(procedimentos a adotar durante a Sessão Plenária: sistema de votação, eleições, temas em debate,
oradores, tempos de intervenção, inscrições online, etc.);
• Próximas reuniões da Comissão Permanente:
Vilnius, Lituânia, 24 de maio de 2024;
Luxemburgo, Luxemburgo, 29 de novembro de 2024.
• Atividades de cooperação 2024 – Programa de trabalho revisto.
A próxima reunião terá lugar no dia 24 de junho, em Estrasburgo, no dia do início da 3.ª Parte da Sessão
Plenária de 2024.
Ao longo da semana, a signatária teve também diversos encontros de trabalho com membros do
secretariado de diversas comissões e com secretários de algumas delegações nacionais.
Realça-se ainda o excelente apoio da Missão Permanente junto do Conselho da Europa, nomeadamente
do Representante Permanente, Embaixador Gilberto Jerónimo, e dos seus colaboradores.
Palácio de São Bento, 10 de maio de 2024.
A Assessora Parlamentar, Ana Maria Guapo.
ANEXOS
Anexo 1 - Ordem de trabalhos da Sessão Plenária
Anexo 2 - Documentos adotados durante a Sessão Plenária
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Doc. 1593717 April 2024
Second part of the 2024 Ordinary Session (15-19 April 2024)
Agenda1
The plenary sittings will be held in the European Parliament Hemicycle.
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 15 April 2024.
https://pace.coe.int
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AbbreviationsBur: Bureau of the AssemblyPer: Standing CommitteePol: Committee on Political Affairs and DemocracyJur: Committee on Legal Affairs and Human RightsSoc: Committee on Social Affairs, Health and Sustainable DevelopmentMig: Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced PersonsCult: Committee on Culture, Science, Education and MediaEga: Committee on Equality and Non-DiscriminationMon: Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee)Pro: Committee on Rules of Procedure, Immunities and Institutional AffairsCdh: Committee on the Election of Judges to the European Court of Human Rights
SOC: Socialists, Democrats and Greens GroupEPP/CD: Group of the European People's PartyEC/DA: European Conservatives Group and Democratic AllianceALDE: Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for EuropeUEL: Group of the Unified European LeftNR: Members not belonging to a political group
Symbols0 Presentation, statement¹ Deadline for tabling documents4 Lists (speakers, questions)% Votes
Meetings outside the Chamber
Bureau of the AssemblyMonday: 08:00-09:30Friday: 08:30-10:00
CommitteesMonday: 14:00-15:15Tuesday: 08:30-10:30Tuesday: 10:30-12:30Wednesday: 10:30-12:30Thursday: 08:30-09:45Thursday: 14:00-15:15
Political groupsMonday: 09:30-12:00Monday: 18:00-19:30Wednesday: 08:30-10:30
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Monday 15 April 2024
Sitting No. 8 (12:15-13:00)
1. Opening of the part-session1.1. Statement by the President
1.2. Examination of credentials0 List of delegations:
o (Doc. 15960)
1.3. Changes in the membership of committees (Commissions (2024) 04 + Add1 + Add2)
1.4. Requests for debate:1.4.1. Urgent procedure debate: "Alexei Navalny's death and the need to counter Vladimir Putin's totalitarian regime and its war on democracy"
1.4.2. Urgent procedure debate: "The arbitrary detention of Vladimir Kara-Murza and the systematic persecution of anti-war protesters in the Russian Federation and Belarus"
1.4.3. Urgent procedure debate: "Draft Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence, Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law"
1.4.4. Current Affairs Debate: "Responding to the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza and preventing further escalations in the Middle East following the recent Iranian attack against Israel"
1.5. Adoption of the agenda
1.6. Approval of the minutes of the Standing Committee (7 March 2024) (AS/Per(2024)PV01)
2. Debate2.1. Progress report of the Bureau and the Standing Committee
0 Presentation by:o Ms Petra BAYR (Austria, SOC), Rapporteur AS/Bur (Doc. 15959, Doc. 15959 Add. 1,Doc. 15959 Add. 2)
4 List of speakers (deadline for registration: Monday 15 April, 10:45)
Sitting No. 9 (15:30-17:30)
3. Joint debate3.1. Relationship between the parliamentary majority and the opposition in a democracy
0 Presentation by:o Ms Elvira KOVÁCS (Serbia, EPP/CD), Rapporteur AS/Pol (Doc. 15946)
3.2. Promoting the revised Code of Good Practice on Referendums0 Presentation by:
o Ms Isabel MEIRELLES (Portugal, EPP/CD), Rapporteur AS/Pol (Doc. 15940)4 List of speakers (deadline for registration: Monday 15 April, 12:00)¹ Amendments (deadline for tabling: Thursday 11 April, 15:30)% Vote on a draft resolution (Doc. 15946)% Vote on a draft resolution (Doc. 15940)
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4. Address (16:30-17:30)4.1. Mr Mihail POPȘOI, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic
of Moldova4 Questions (deadline for registration: Monday 15 April, 12:00)
Tuesday 16 April 2024
Sitting No. 10 (14:30-20:00)
5. Elections (14:30-18:00)5.1. Judges to the European Court of Human Rights
0 List of candidates:o Ireland (Doc. 15938, Doc. 15959 Add. 2)o Latvia (Doc. 15949, Doc. 15959 Add. 2)o Liechtenstein (Doc. 15924, Doc. 15959 Add. 2)
6. Question time (14:30-15:00)6.1. Ms Marija PEJČINOVIĆ BURIĆ, Secretary General of the Council of Europe4 Questions (deadline for registration: Monday 15 April, 16:30)
7. Debate7.1. Support for the reconstruction of Ukraine
0 Presentation by:o Mr Lulzim BASHA (Albania, EPP/CD), Rapporteur AS/Pol (Doc. 15932)o Mr Davor Ivo STIER (Croatia, EPP/CD), Rapporteur for opinion AS/Jur (Doc. 15941)
0 Statement by:o Mr Ruslan STEFANCHUK, Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada, Ukraine
4 List of speakers (deadline for registration: Monday 15 April, 16:30)¹ Amendments (deadline for tabling: Friday 12 April, 14:30)% Votes on a draft resolution and a draft recommendation (Doc. 15932)
8. Debate8.1. Application by Kosovo* for membership of the Council of Europe2
0 Presentation by:o Ms Dora BAKOYANNIS (Greece, EPP/CD), Rapporteur AS/Pol (Doc. 15958, Doc. 15957)o Ms Azadeh ROJHAN (Sweden, SOC), Rapporteur for opinion AS/Jur (Doc. 15964)o Ms Béatrice FRESKO-ROLFO (Monaco, ALDE), Rapporteur for opinion AS/Ega(Doc. 15965)
4 List of speakers (deadline for registration: Monday 15 April, 16:30)¹ Amendments (deadline for tabling: Monday 15 April, 10:00)% Vote on a draft opinion (Doc. 15958)
2. *Throughout this text, all reference to Kosovo, whether to the territory, institutions or population shall be understood infull compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 and without prejudice to the status of Kosovo.
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Wednesday 17 April 2024
Sitting No. 11 (14:30-20:30)
9. Election (2nd round) (14:30-18:00)9.1. Judge to the European Court of Human Rights
0 List of candidates:o Liechtenstein (Doc. 15924, Doc. 15959 Add. 2)
10. Address (14:30-15:30)10.1. Communication from the Committee of Ministers
0 Presentation by:o Ms Dominique HASLER, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Education, and Sport of Liechtensteinand President of the Committee of Ministers
4 Questions (deadline for registration: Tuesday 16 April, 19:00)
11. Joint debate11.1. Urgent procedure debate: "Alexei Navalny's death and the need to counter Vladimir
Putin's totalitarian regime and its war on democracy"0 Presentation by:
o Mr Emanuelis ZINGERIS (Lithuania, EPP/CD), Rapporteur AS/Jur (Doc. 15966)
11.2. Urgent procedure debate: "The arbitrary detention of Vladimir Kara-Murza and the systematic persecution of anti-war protesters in the Russian Federation and Belarus"0 Presentation by:
o Ms Thórhildur Sunna ÆVARSDÓTTIR (Iceland, SOC), Rapporteur AS/Jur (Doc. 15967)
11.3. Sanctions against persons on the "Kara-Murza list"0 Presentation by:
o Mr Eerik-Niiles KROSS (Estonia, ALDE), Rapporteur AS/Jur (Doc. 15939)0 Statement by:
o Ms Evgenia KARA-MURZA4 List of speakers (deadline for registration: Tuesday 16 April, 19:00)¹ Amendments (deadline for tabling: Tuesday 16 April, 16:00)% Vote on a draft resolution (Doc. 15966)% Vote on a draft resolution (Doc. 15967)% Vote on a draft resolution (Doc. 15939)
12. Debate12.1. Freedom of expression and assembly of LGBTI people in Europe
0 Presentation by:o Mr Christophe LACROIX (Belgium, SOC), Rapporteur AS/Ega (Doc. 15953)
4 List of speakers (deadline for registration: Tuesday 16 April, 19:00)¹ Amendments (deadline for tabling: Monday 15 April, 14:30)% Vote on a draft resolution (Doc. 15953)
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13. Debate13.1. The honouring of obligations and commitments by Albania
0 Presentation by:o Mr Ionuț-Marian STROE (Romania, EPP/CD), Co-Rapporteur AS/Mon (Doc. 15950)
4 List of speakers (deadline for registration: Tuesday 16 April, 19:00)¹ Amendments (deadline for tabling: Monday 15 April, 14:30)% Vote on a draft resolution (Doc. 15950)
Thursday 18 April 2024
Sitting No. 12 (10:00-12:30)
14. Address (10:00-10:30)14.1. H.S.H. Hereditary Prince Alois von und zu Liechtenstein
15. Joint debate15.1. Mainstreaming the human right to a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment with
the Reykjavik process0 Presentation by:
o Mr Simon MOUTQUIN (Belgium, SOC), Rapporteur AS/Soc (Doc. 15955)
15.2. Towards Council of Europe strategies for healthy seas and oceans to counter the climate crisis0 Presentation by:
o Ms Yuliia OVCHYNNYKOVA (Ukraine, ALDE), Rapporteur AS/Soc (Doc. 15956)4 List of speakers (deadline for registration: Wednesday 17 April, 19:00)¹ Amendments (deadline for tabling: Tuesday 16 April, 10:00)% Votes on a draft resolution and a draft recommendation (Doc. 15955)% Votes on a draft resolution and a draft recommendation (Doc. 15956)
Sitting No. 13 (15:30-20:00)
16. Debate under urgent procedure16.1. Draft Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence, Human Rights, Democracy and the
Rule of Law0 Presentation by:
o Ms Thórhildur Sunna ÆVARSDÓTTIR (Iceland, SOC), Rapporteur AS/Jur (Doc. 15971,Doc. 15951)
4 List of speakers (deadline for registration: Thursday 18 April, 11:30)¹ Amendments (deadline for tabling: Wednesday 17 April, 16:00)% Vote on a draft opinion (Doc. 15971)
17. Current affairs debate17.1. Responding to the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza and preventing further escalations in
the Middle East following the recent Iranian attack against Israel4 List of speakers (deadline for registration: Thursday 18 April, 11:30)
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Friday 19 April 2024
Sitting No. 14 (10:30-13:00)
18. Debate18.1. The protection of children against online violence
0 Presentation by:o Mr Joseph O'REILLY (Ireland, EPP/CD), Rapporteur AS/Soc (Doc. 15954)
4 List of speakers (deadline for registration: Thursday 18 April, 19:00)¹ Amendments (deadline for tabling: Wednesday 17 April, 10:30)% Votes on a draft resolution and a draft recommendation (Doc. 15954)
19. Progress report (continued)19.1. Progress report of the Bureau and the Standing Committee (continued)
0 Addendum:o (Doc. 15959 Add. 3)
20. Closure of the part-session
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F – 67075 Strasbourg Cedex | Tel: + 33 3 88 41 2000 |
2024 ORDINARY SESSION
Second part
15 – 19 April 2024
TEXTS ADOPTED
BY THE ASSEMBLY
Provisional versions
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Table of contents
Opinions
Opinion 302 (2024) Application by Kosovo* for membership of the Council of Europe (Doc. 15958)
* Throughout this text, all reference to Kosovo, whether to the territory, institutions or population shall be understood in full compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 and without prejudice to the status of Kosovo.
Opinion 303 (2024) Draft Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence, Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law (Doc. 15971)
Recommendations
Recommendation 2271 (2024) Support for the reconstruction of Ukraine (Doc. 15932)
Recommendation 2272 (2024) Mainstreaming the human right to a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment with the Reykjavik process (Doc. 15955)
Recommendation 2273 (2024) Towards Council of Europe strategies for healthy seas and oceans to counter the climate crisis (Doc. 15956)
Recommendation 2274 (2024) The protection of children against online violence (Doc. 15954)
Resolutions
Resolution 2537 (2024) Relationship between the parliamentary majority and the opposition in a democracy (Doc. 15946)
Resolution 2538 (2024) Promoting the revised Code of Good Practice on Referendums (Doc. 15940)
Resolution 2539 (2024) Support for the reconstruction of Ukraine (Doc. 15932)
Resolution 2540 (2024) Alexei Navalny's death and the need to counter Vladimir Putin's totalitarian regime and its war on democracy (Doc. 15966)
Resolution 2541 (2024) The arbitrary detention of Vladimir Kara-Murza and the systematic persecution of anti-war protesters in the Russian Federation and Belarus (Doc. 15967)
Resolution 2542 (2024) Sanctions against persons on the "Kara-Murza list" (Doc. 15939)
Resolution 2543 (2024) Freedom of expression and assembly of LGBTI people in Europe (Doc. 15953)
Resolution 2544 (2024) The honouring of obligations and commitments by Albania (Doc. 15950)
Resolution 2545 (2024) Mainstreaming the human right to a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment with the Reykjavik process (Doc. 15955)
Resolution 2546 (2024) Towards Council of Europe strategies for healthy seas and oceans to counter the climate crisis (Doc. 15956)
Resolution 2547 (2024) The protection of children against online violence (Doc. 15954)
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Opinion 302 (2024)1Provisional version
Application by Kosovo* for membership of the Council of Europe
Parliamentary Assembly
1. Kosovo applied for membership of the Council of Europe on 12 May 2022 with a letter signed byMs Donika Gërvalla-Schwarz, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and Diaspora. On 24 April2023, the Committee of Ministers transmitted the letter to the Parliamentary Assembly for consultation, inpursuance of Statutory Resolution (51) 30 A adopted on 3 May 1951. The decision on the transmissionclarifies that it is “without prejudice to the Committee of Ministers’ future consideration of this application toaccede to the Council of Europe”.
2. Having taken note of the eminent lawyers’ report, the Assembly acknowledges that Kosovo’s legalframework is broadly in line with Council of Europe standards and that its Constitution is a very progressiveinstrument, incorporating the key provisions of the Ahtisaari Plan and providing for the direct applicability ofthe European Convention on Human Rights (ETS No. 5) and its Protocols, the Framework Convention for theProtection of National Minorities (ETS No. 157), the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing andCombating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (CETS No. 210, “Istanbul Convention”) as wellas some United Nations human rights instruments.
3. The Assembly acknowledges the progress made by Kosovo in the areas of human rights, democracyand the rule of law and commends the advancements made by the current government, including as regardsthe fight against corruption and a civil partnership for same-sex couples (“Civil Code”).
4. The Council of Europe, in synergy with the international community, has supported the strengthening ofstandards in Kosovo through a wide range of activities including legal advice, co-operation and specificsolutions which have enabled Council of Europe monitoring mechanisms to regularly assess the situation inspecific areas of human rights law. Kosovo joined the Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB) in 2013and the Venice Commission the following year. Since 2016, a delegation of the Assembly of Kosovo hasparticipated in the work of the Parliamentary Assembly. The Association of Kosovo Municipalities participatesin the work of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities.
5. The Assembly believes that Kosovo’s aspirations to join the Council of Europe should be met with apositive response. Membership would lead to the strengthening of human rights standards by ensuring accessto the European Court of Human Rights to all those who are under Kosovo’s jurisdiction. It would also enablethe Council of Europe to have greater oversight of domestic developments and to deploy all the instruments atits disposal to contribute to consolidating democracy and the rule of law. Furthermore, membership of theCouncil of Europe would represent a milestone in the process of Kosovo’s European integration.
1. Assembly debate on 16 April 2024 (10th sitting) (see Doc. 15958, Doc. 15957, report of the Committee on PoliticalAffairs and Democracy, rapporteur: Ms Dora Bakoyannis; Doc. 15964, opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs andHuman Rights, rapporteur: Ms Azadeh Rojhan; and Doc. 15965, opinion of the Committee on Equality and Non-Discrimination, rapporteur: Ms Béatrice Fresko-Rolfo). Text adopted by the Assembly on 16 April 2024 (10th sitting).
* Throughout this text, all reference to Kosovo, whether to the territory, institutions or population shall be understoodin full compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 and without prejudice to the status of Kosovo.
https://pace.coe.int
Opinions 302 and 303
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6. Kosovo’s membership of the Council of Europe would be the culmination of a dialogue which hasdeveloped over a span of two decades but should in no way be seen as the end of a process. On thecontrary, membership should catalyse momentum for Kosovo to continue to make progress in strengtheninghuman rights, democracy and the rule of law and address outstanding challenges and matters of concern.
7. Amongst such issues are a gap between the normative framework and its effective implementation; theneed to improve the protection of the rights of non-majority communities and to foster a climate and publicdiscourse which is conducive to trust, reconciliation and inclusion; focusing on language, education and youthpolicies to ensure that Kosovo’s multi-ethnic society is cohesive rather than fragmented along ethnic orlanguage cleavages; ensuring full compliance with the rule of law irrespective of political considerations;promoting interinstitutional respect; and strengthening the quality and efficiency of the judiciary.
8. Since Kosovo applied for membership of the Council of Europe, the security situation in Kosovo’snorthern municipalities has considerably deteriorated in parallel with a stall of the normalisation of relationswith Serbia and in the dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade facilitated by the EU Special RepresentativeMr Miroslav Lajčák. Many events have contributed to a serious escalation of tensions, including: landexpropriations; the decision to enforce the use of Kosovo car licence plates; violent demonstrations; the massresignation of Kosovo Serbs from the police, the judiciary and public offices; local elections which gave resultsdeprived of democratic legitimacy; the use by the Kosovo authorities of the special police for ordinary policetasks; and the enforcement of the decision to introduce the euro for financial transactions to the exclusion ofother currencies, later postponed.
9. On 24 September 2023, a major security incident in Banjska resulted in the death of a Kosovo policeofficer and three Serb assailants. The gravity of this attack, its consequences and the attackers’ connectionswith Belgrade abundantly showed that the risk of open violence in Kosovo is all too real and that securitydepends on the protection of the rights of the Serb community, the de-escalation of tensions and thenormalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia.
10. Against this background, the Assembly welcomes as a major breakthrough the implementation, on14 March 2024, of the judgment of the Constitutional Court in the case of the Visoki Dečani monastery, whichhad been awaiting execution since 2016. Its implementation is a tangible sign of the commitment of thegovernment to act in full accordance with the rule of law, irrespective of political considerations. The Assemblyand the Committee of Ministers should continue to follow this matter with a view to ensuring that the judgmentis fully implemented.
11. The Assembly considers the establishment of the Association of Serb majority municipalities animportant step and a way to enhance the democratic participation and empowerment of Kosovo Serbs andensure the protection of their rights. The Assembly considers that the establishment of the Association shouldfeature in the Committee of Ministers’ future consideration of Kosovo’s application to accede to the Council ofEurope, as a post-accession commitment for Kosovo.
12. Furthermore, the Assembly expects that expropriations are conducted in the strictest respect of the lawand that any future legislation in this area is fully in compliance with the Ahtisaari Plan, including with regard tothe protection of the properties of the Serbian Orthodox Church. In this context, the Assembly recommendsthat the draft Law on Expropriation of Immovable Property which has been submitted to the Assembly ofKosovo be amended accordingly, at the earliest possible date.
13. Against this background, the Assembly welcomes the commitment made in a letter dated 3 March 2024by Mr Albin Kurti, Prime Minister of Kosovo, to sign and ratify an extensive list of Council of Europeconventions, including:
13.1. at the time of accession: the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ETS No. 5);
13.2. within one year of accession:
– the General Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the Council of Europe (ETS No. 2) andits Protocols Nos. 1 and 6 (ETS Nos. 10 and 162)
– the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (ETS No. 157)
– the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages (ETS No. 148)
– the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women anddomestic violence (CETS No. 210)
– the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Being (CETS No. 197)
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– the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment orPunishment (ETS No. 126)
– the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (ETS No. 90)
– the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (CETS No. 196)
– the Protocol amending the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (ETS No.190)
– the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of theProceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism (CETS No. 198)
– the European Charter of Local Self-Government (ETS No. 122);
13.3. within two years of accession:
– the European Convention on the Exercise of Children’s Rights (ETS No. 160)
– the European Convention on Nationality (ETS No. 166)
– the European Social Charter (revised) (ETS No. 163)
– the Civil Law Convention on Corruption (ETS No. 174)
– the Additional Protocol to the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (ETS No. 191)
– the European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation between TerritorialCommunities or Authorities (ETS No. 106) and its protocols
– the European Convention on the International Validity of Criminal Judgments (ETS No. 70)
– the European Convention on the Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes (ETS No. 116)
– the European Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitation to Crimes againstHumanity and War Crimes (ETS No. 82)
– the Second Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in CriminalMatters (ETS No. 182);
13.4. as well as:
– the Council of Europe Convention on the Avoidance of Statelessness in related to StateSuccession (CETS No. 200)
– the Convention on Cybercrime (ETS No. 185) and its Additional Protocol (ETS No. 189)
– the European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers (ETS No. 93)
– the European Cultural Convention (ETS No. 18)
– the European Convention on the Recognition of University Qualifications (ETS No. 32)
– the Convention on the Academic Recognition of Qualifications concerning Higher Education inthe European Region (ETS No. 165)
– the European Convention on the Equivalence of Diplomas leading to Admission to Universities(ETS No. 15)
– the Convention on the Elaboration of a European Pharmacopoeia (ETS No. 50).
14. Furthermore, the Assembly takes note of and welcomes the following commitments undertaken by theKosovo authorities:
14.1. as regards the functioning of democratic institutions and the respect of the rule of law:
14.1.1. fully respect the independence of the judiciary including by refraining from undue criticism undermining trust in the judiciary;
14.1.2. continue to improve the quality and effectiveness of the judiciary;
14.1.3. continue to fight against corruption and organised crime;
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14.1.4. ensure that expropriations are conducted in the strictest respect of the law and that any future legislation in this area is fully in compliance with the Ahtisaari Plan, including with regard to the protection of the properties of the Serbian Orthodox Church; amend accordingly the draft Law on Expropriation of Immovable Property, which has been submitted to the Assembly of Kosovo, at the earliest possible date;
14.1.5. take all measures to de-escalate tensions in the north of Kosovo and refrain from decisions which may affect the rights and living conditions of the Serb community and lead to a further deterioration of the security situation;
14.1.6. take urgent measures to promote the reintegration of Kosovo Serbs in the police force, the judiciary and the prosecution in the north of Kosovo;
14.1.7. refrain from using special police in the north of Kosovo for ordinary police tasks, ensure that they are deployed only in case of necessity, and step up co-operation with KFOR (Kosovo Force) and EULEX (European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo);
14.2. as regards human rights and protection of non-majority communities:
14.2.1. ensure the effective implementation of the legal framework for the protection of national minorities;
14.2.2. take substantial and tangible steps with a view to implementing all articles of the Brussels and of the Ohrid Agreements which includes establishing the Association of Serb majority municipalities as soon as possible;
14.2.3. address urgently the absence of a comprehensive and co-ordinated approach on minority matters and rights; such an approach needs to be developed and implemented in co-operation with those concerned and in ways which reflect the specific needs of different communities;
14.2.4. allocate sufficient resources to effectively implement the legislation on the use of languages and ensure the legal entrenchment, independence and provision of adequate resources for the Office of the Language Commissioner;
14.2.5. step up measures to support the socio-economic integration and political participation of persons belonging to non-majority communities;
14.2.6. take visible and meaningful measures to promote reconciliation between Kosovo’s communities, including in political discourse; adopt concrete strategies for inter-community dialogue and for reconciliation-oriented spaces and activities, in particular in education, in order to pave the way for inclusive societal development and trust;
14.2.7. promote teaching of non-majority languages in schools;
14.2.8. ensure the effective access to good quality primary and secondary education and textbooks for all children, including children with disabilities, children belonging to non-majority communities and children from disadvantaged groups;
14.3. as regards international relations:
14.3.1. continue to engage in the EU-facilitated dialogue and honour the commitments and obligations undertaken under its aegis;
14.3.2. put genuine efforts into the process of normalisation of relations with Serbia;
14.3.3. settle international disputes in a peaceful manner and promote good neighbourly relations in the region.
15. The Assembly also recommends that Kosovo signs and ratifies the following Council of EuropeConventions and Partial Agreements:
– Protocols 1, 4, 7, 12, 13 and 16 to the European Convention on Human Rights
– the Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and SexualAbuse (CETS No. 201)
– the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (ETS No. 173)
– The enlarged partial agreement setting up the Council of Europe international cooperation group ondrugs and addictions (Pompidou Group)
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– the enlarged partial Agreement on the Register of Damage Caused by the Aggression of the RussianFederation against Ukraine.
16. The Assembly invites Kosovo to:
16.1. fully participate in the Council of Europe’s Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-MoneyLaundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL) and to thereafter implement itsrecommendations without delay;
16.2. amend the composition of the Kosovo Prosecutorial Council in line with the recommendations ofthe Venice Commission in its Opinion CDL-AD(2023)043 adopted on 15-16 December 2023;
16.3. refer the new draft law on expropriations to the Venice Commission, for an opinion;
16.4. ensure self-restraint of politicians, who should refrain from criticising decisions of the judiciary;
16.5. improve respect for administrative procedures, in particular for expropriations and publicappointments and consider introducing an administrative complaint procedure;
16.6. launch procedural reforms to tackle the excessive length of judicial proceedings and considercreating a specific remedy for excessive length of proceedings;
16.7. reduce excessive recourse to pre-charge and pre-trial detention for unduly lengthy periods oftime and without proper reasons;
16.8. promote the use of de-escalatory policing techniques, especially by police deployed in the northof Kosovo;
16.9. improve language training and education to meet the constitutional requirements for bilingualismin actual practice, especially in the police force and the justice system;
16.10. foster awareness among police officers, prosecutors and judges of hate crimes and strengthentheir ability to treat victims of such crimes with sensitivity; improve the response of these actors in thejudicial system to the issue of domestic violence.
17. The Assembly reasserts the importance of protecting the human rights of all, including the rights ofpersons from non-majority communities, women’s rights, the rights of LGBTI persons and the rights ofpersons with disabilities. It calls on the authorities of Kosovo to:
17.1. ensure the legal recognition of civil partnerships for same-sex couples;
17.2. step up efforts to combat discrimination on any grounds;
17.3. promote gender equality;
17.4. prevent and combat gender-based violence, and prosecute and punish perpetrators of this violence;
17.5. prevent and combat hate speech.
18. In light of the above, the Assembly considers that Kosovo is able and willing to:
18.1. fulfil the provisions of Article 3 of the Council of Europe Statute which stipulates that “[e]verymember of the Council of Europe must accept the principles of the rule of law and of the enjoyment byall persons within its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental freedoms”;
18.2. collaborate sincerely and effectively in the realisation of the aim of the Council of Europe asspecified in Chapter I of the Statute, thereby fulfilling the conditions for accession to the Council ofEurope as laid down in Article 4 of the Statute.
19. The Assembly, therefore, recommends that the Committee of Ministers:
19.1. invite Kosovo to become a member of the Council of Europe with the name “Kosovo”;
19.2. allocate 3 seats to Kosovo in the Parliamentary Assembly.
20. While supporting Kosovo’s membership of the Council of Europe, the Assembly is aware of theunprecedented circumstances of this application, as a number of Council of Europe member States do notrecognise Kosovo as a State. Diplomacy, dialogue and compromise are necessary to ensure that the
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20.1. Kosovo’s membership of the Council of Europe is without prejudice to individual member States’ positions as regards the statehood of Kosovo;
20.2. member States, irrespective of the position they may express in relation to Kosovo’s membership application, respect the decision made by the Committee of Ministers and collaborate sincerely and effectively in its implementation, ensuring the smooth functioning of Council of Europe’s institutions, bodies and mechanisms;
20.3. once Kosovo is admitted as a member State for the purposes of the Council of Europe Statute, the Organisation discontinues its status-neutral policy.
21. Likewise, the Assembly calls on the Committee of Ministers to spare no diplomatic and political effort toensure that Kosovo’s membership is not only beneficial to Kosovo and all those who are under its jurisdictionbut is also a factor of stability, democratic security and peace in the Western Balkans and Europe.
22. With a view to ensuring compliance with commitments and obligations and monitoring theimplementation of its recommendations, the Assembly decides, pursuant to its Resolution 1115 (1997), toopen the monitoring procedure for Kosovo as from its accession to the Council of Europe.
prospective admission of Kosovo does not create a fracture in the unity of Council of Europe member States, thus undermining the spirit of the Reykjavik Summit. The Assembly, therefore, invites the Committee of Ministers to ensure that:
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Opinion 303 (2024)1Provisional version
Draft Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence, Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law
Parliamentary Assembly
1. The Parliamentary Assembly considers that artificial intelligence (AI) brings both opportunities andchallenges. The position of the Assembly in this field has always highlighted the importance of striking theright balance between mitigating the risks and making full use of the advantages that AI can offer in promotinga better life for all.
2. The Assembly recalls its previous work on AI. In 2020, it adopted a set of resolutions andrecommendations examining the opportunities and risks of AI for democracy, human rights and the rule oflaw. These included Resolutions 2341 (2020) “Need for democratic governance of artificial intelligence”,2342 (2020) “Justice by algorithm – The role of artificial intelligence in policing and criminal justice systems”,2343 (2020) “Preventing discrimination caused by the use of artificial intelligence”, 2344 (2020) “The brain-computer interface: new rights or new threats to fundamental freedoms?”, 2345 (2020) “Artificial intelligenceand labour markets: friend or foe?”, 2346 (2020) “Legal aspects of ‘autonomous’ vehicles”, its relatedrecommendations as well as Recommendation 2185 (2020) “Artificial intelligence in health care: medical,legal and ethical challenges ahead”. The Assembly endorsed a set of key ethical principles that should berespected when developing and implementing AI applications. These principles, which were further elaboratedin a common appendix to all these reports, are:
2.1. transparency, including accessibility and explicability;
2.2. justice and fairness, including non-discrimination;
2.3. human responsibility for decisions, including liability and availability of remedies;
2.4. safety and security;
2.5. privacy and data protection.
3. The Assembly strongly believes that legal regulation is necessary in order to avoid or mitigate thepotential risks to democracy, human rights and the rule of law arising from the use of AI. In this context, theCouncil of Europe, as a leading international standard-setting organisation in the field of democracy, humanrights and the rule of law, should play a pioneering role. While supporting the work of the Council of EuropeAd hoc Committee on Artificial Intelligence (CAHAI) at the time, Assembly called on the Committee ofMinisters to decide upon the preparation of a legally binding instrument governing artificial intelligence,possibly in the form of a convention open also to non-member States that should be based on acomprehensive approach, deal with the whole life cycle of AI-based systems, be addressed to all stakeholdersand include mechanisms to ensure its implementation. The Assembly therefore warmly welcomes thefinalisation of the draft Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence, Human Rights, Democracy and theRule of Law by the Council of Europe Committee on Artificial Intelligence (CAI).
1. Assembly debate on 18 April 2024 (13th sitting) (see Doc. 15971, report of Committee on Legal Affairs and HumanRights, rapporteur: Ms Thórhildur Sunna Ævarsdóttir). Text adopted by the Assembly on 18 April 2024 (13th sitting).
https://pace.coe.int
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4. The Assembly has always considered that private actors should fall within the scope of such a legallybinding instrument. In its Resolution 2341 (2020), it expressed the view that the instrument should containprovisions to limit the risks of the use of AI-based technologies by State and private actors to exercise controlover people, and that the activity of private actors should be subject to democratic oversight.
5. The Framework Convention, once adopted, will become the first ever international treaty on AI. It isbased on the Council of Europe’s standards on human rights, democracy and the rule of law, which are alsoshared by the non-member States that participated in the negotiations. This is an example of the Council ofEurope’s leadership in developing standards in emerging areas, including the digital sphere, in line with theReykjavik Declaration adopted by the Heads of State and Government in May 2023. Part of the FrameworkConvention’s added value will be its global reach, since it will bring together States from all over the worldwishing to address the global challenges posed by AI with a human rights-based approach. The Assemblytherefore understands that the drafting process has had to accommodate diverse legal and political traditionsand systems, with the result that the draft text often contains very general and abstract provisions, allowing fora certain level of flexibility in its implementation. Its “framework” nature also means that it will need to besupplemented by other binding or non-binding instruments concerning the use of AI in specific sectors ordeveloping certain provisions of the convention further. The Assembly is ready to contribute to the preparationof such instruments.
6. The Assembly is satisfied that most of the key ethical principles endorsed in its 2020 reports arereflected in different provisions of the draft Framework Convention, although some of these principles couldhave been formulated as positive individual rights rather than general principles (for instance, privacy, equalityand non-discrimination). Furthermore, it could have been made even clearer that each individual governmentshould be obliged to inform its citizens of the use of AI systems in administrative processes leading to bindinglegal decisions. Another significant added value of this draft Framework Convention is that it is intended toprotect not only human rights but also democratic processes and the rule of law in the context of AI. AItechnologies have a potential to disrupt the functioning of democratic institutions and processes, for instancethrough interference in electoral processes, disinformation and manipulation of public opinion. They can alsohave an impact on the functioning of the rule of law, including the independence and impartiality of thejudiciary and access to justice. In this regard, the Assembly considers that the interpretation of “democraticinstitutions and processes” and “the rule of law” within the meaning of the draft Framework Convention shouldbe guided by the relevant standards developed over the years by Council of Europe bodies such as theEuropean Court of Human Rights and the European Commission for Democracy through Law (VeniceCommission), as well as by the Reykjavik Principles for Democracy. The drafters however missed theopportunity to cover more specifically the positive uses of AI for democratic processes, for instance improvinggovernment accountability and facilitating democratic action and participation.
7. The Assembly regrets that the draft Framework Convention does not cover to an equal extent publicand private actors. Rather, it introduces a system where each Party will be able to determine in a declarationhow it intends to address the risks and impacts arising from the use of AI by private actors. This is far fromideal for legal certainty and predictability of the obligations imposed by the Framework Convention and is notin line with the positions previously expressed by the Assembly, the Council of Europe Commissioner forHuman Rights and the CAHAI. It also goes against the principle that States have positive obligations toprotect individuals against human rights abuses by private actors, in accordance with the case law of theEuropean Court of Human Rights, the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights andrelevant recommendations of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. Many AI systems aredeveloped and deployed by private entities, and introducing a differentiated approach for the private sectorcreates a significant loophole.
8. The Assembly therefore strongly calls on all member States of the Council of Europe, when ratifying theFramework Convention and submitting their declarations under Article 3.1 (b), to recognise the full applicabilityof the principles and obligations set forth therein (Chapters II to VI) to activities of private actors, and to reportaccordingly to the future Conference of the Parties under Article 24. It further invites the Conference of theParties to fully use its powers and conduct a proper review of how all Parties comply with Article 3.1 (b). TheAssembly believes that a dynamic interpretation of this provision by the follow-up mechanism set up by theFramework Convention will foster advances over time, through reporting requirements and peer pressure,including with respect to non-member States that may choose not to apply the Framework Conventionobligations to private actors.
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9. Having considered some of the proposals by different stakeholders, and taking due account of theoverall structure and the transversal character of the agreed text, the Assembly proposes the followingamendments to the draft Framework Convention:
9.1. replace Article 3.2 with the following text: “Each Party may restrict the application of the provisions of this Convention if activities within the lifecycle of artificial intelligence systems are necessary to protect its national security or national defence interests and if such activities are conducted in a manner consistent with applicable international law, including international human rights law obligations, and with respect for its democratic institutions and processes.”;
9.2. delete Article 3.4;
9.3. in Article 5.1, after “effectiveness of democratic institutions and processes, including” add the following words: “free and fair elections,”;
9.4. in Chapter III, add the following article: “Every Party shall adopt or maintain measures to preserve health and the environment in the context of activities within the lifecycle of artificial intelligence systems, in line with applicable international and domestic law.”;
9.5. in Article 14.2 (c) or in the explanatory report, add a reference to “judicial authorities” or “judicial review”;
9.6. in Article 15.1, add a reference to “human review”;
9.7. in Articles 16.1, 16.2 (a), (e) and 16.3, after the words “the rule of law” add the following words: “and the preservation of the environment”;
9.8. replace Article 16.4 with the following text: “Each Party shall take such legislative or other measures as may be required to put in place mechanisms for a moratorium or ban or limitations in respect of certain uses of artificial intelligence systems where such uses are considered incompatible with the respect of human rights, the functioning of democracy or the rule of law.”;
9.9. in Chapter VI, add the following article: “Each Party shall take appropriate measures to ensure protection of whistleblowers in relation to the activities within the lifecycle of artificial intelligence systems which could adversely impact human rights, democracy and the rule of law.”;
9.10. at the end of Article 26.2, add the following sentence: “The functions and powers of such mechanisms shall include investigative powers, the power to act upon complaints, periodic reporting, promotion, public awareness and consultation on the effective implementation of this Convention.”;
9.11. in Chapter VII, after Article 26, add the following article: “Parliamentary involvement”: “1. National parliaments shall be invited to participate in the follow-up and review of the measures taken for the implementation of this Convention. 2. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe shall be invited to regularly take stock of the implementation of this Convention.”
10. The Assembly wishes to participate in the future Conference of the Parties set up by the FrameworkConvention and engage in the co-operation and exchange of information envisaged under Article 25.
11. The Assembly invites its Sub-Committee on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights to raise awarenessof the Framework Convention once adopted, including by promoting its ratification or accession by memberStates, observer States, and States whose parliaments enjoy observer or partner for democracy status withthe Assembly.
12. Finally, the Assembly will continue to work on AI-related issues, through new reports on emergingtopics and by following closely and contributing where necessary to the standard-setting activities of the CAIand other relevant Council of Europe inter-governmental bodies.
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Recommendation 2271 (2024)1Provisional version
Support for the reconstruction of Ukraine
Parliamentary Assembly
1. The Parliamentary Assembly draws the Committee of Ministers’ attention to its Resolution 2539 (2024)“Support for the reconstruction of Ukraine” which makes a resolute call for using confiscated Russian Stateassets to compensate damages, injury and losses caused by the aggression of the Russian Federation andfor supporting the reconstruction of Ukraine.
2. The Assembly refers to its Resolution 2516 (2023) “Ensuring a just peace in Ukraine and lastingsecurity in Europe”, which called for establishing “a comprehensive compensation mechanism, including aninternational commission for the examination of claims for damages recorded in the Register of Damage, anda compensation fund to pay out on decisions on compensation for damage awarded by the commission, inparticular by confiscating and otherwise using the Russian Federation’s assets to pay for damage caused bythe war in Ukraine”. It also refers to its Resolution 2482 (2023) “Legal and human rights aspects of theRussian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine”, which called on Council of Europe member States to setup an international compensation mechanism; highlighted the reasons why the Council of Europe should havea leading role in setting up and managing it; and detailed some of its key prospective features.
3. The Assembly recalls the decisions of the Committee of Ministers of 15 September 2022 and24 February 2023 to welcome all efforts to secure full reparations for the damages caused by violations by theRussian Federation of international law in Ukraine. It also underscores that, in its Resolution CM/Res(2023)3establishing the Enlarged Partial Agreement on the Register of Damage Caused by the Aggression of theRussian Federation against Ukraine, adopted on 12 May 2023, the Committee of Ministers agreed “tocontinue working, in co-operation with Ukraine and relevant international organisations and bodies, towardsthe establishment by a separate international instrument of a future international compensation mechanism,which may include a claims commission and a compensation fund, of which the work of the Register,including its digital platform with all data about claims and evidence recorded therein is intended to constitutean integral part”.
4. In light of the above, the Assembly calls on the Committee of Ministers to:
4.1. proceed towards the establishment of an international compensation mechanism, under theauspices of the Council of Europe, to comprehensively address the damages incurred by natural andlegal persons concerned, as well as the State of Ukraine due to the unlawful actions of the RussianFederation in its invasion of Ukraine;
4.2. establish an international trust fund, where all seized Russian State assets will be deposited,ensuring transparency, accountability, and equity in the disbursement of funds that should be used forcompensation to Ukraine and natural or legal persons affected by the Russian aggression in Ukraine aswell as to aid Ukraine's recovery and reconstruction efforts;
4.3. endorse the establishment of an international commission of claims for the damages recorded inthe Register, under the auspices of the Council of Europe;
1. Assembly debate on 16 April 2024 (10th sitting) (see Doc. 15932, report of the Committee on Political Affairs andDemocracy, rapporteur: Mr Lulzim Basha; and Doc. 15941, opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights,rapporteur: Mr Davor Ivo Stier). Text adopted by the Assembly on 16 April 2024 (10th sitting).
4.4. consider including, in the scope of the future international compensation mechanism, once established, the damage caused by the Russian Federation’s internationally wrongful acts committed in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the city of Sevastopol and the temporarily occupied territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts before 24 February 2022, in so far as they were caused by the aggression against Ukraine started in 2014, in particular in relation to breaches of international law confirmed by international adjudicative bodies such as the European Court of Human Rights.
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Recommendation 2272 (2024)1Provisional version
Mainstreaming the human right to a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment with the Reykjavik process
Parliamentary Assembly
1. The Parliamentary Assembly refers to its Resolution 2545 (2024) “Mainstreaming the human right to asafe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment with the Reykjavik process”.
2. The Assembly maintains that the recognition of the right to a healthy environment must be based on ahuman rights approach. In this regard, it reaffirms its Recommendation 2211 (2021) “Anchoring the right to ahealthy environment: need for enhanced action by the Council of Europe”, in which it proposedcomplementary tools to achieve this.
3. The Assembly notes that the Council of Europe already offers a convention ecosystem covering manyaspects of the right to a healthy environment. It sees this as an opportunity to capitalise on existing standards.
4. The Assembly therefore recommends that the Committee of Ministers:
4.1. actively support the work of the Intersecretariat Task Force on the Environment established following the 4th Council of Europe Summit, and carefully consider its proposals when drawing up a strategy and an action plan;
4.2. give utmost priority to implementing the encouragement made in Reykjavik to set up an ad hoc intergovernmental committee to organise, co-ordinate and run the implementation of the strategy and the action plan;
4.3. devote the normative part of the strategy to the formal recognition of the right to a healthy environment at the level of the Council of Europe, by developing a binding legal instrument as soon as possible;
4.4. in so doing, focus on the rapid implementation of Recommendation 2211 (2021), including devising a specific, autonomous instrument covering substantive rights and procedural matters relating to the environment that capitalises fully on the standards which have already been drawn up;
4.5. ensure that the draft convention superseding and replacing the Convention on the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law (ETS No. 172), currently being prepared within the Council of Europe, incorporates the notion of ecocide as a criminal offense and establishes an effective monitoring mechanism;
4.6. give the ad hoc intergovernmental committee a multidisciplinary role, enabling it to act as an interface between the Council of Europe and civil society in its broadest sense and to carry out activities aimed at environmental monitoring and governance as soon as it has been set up;
4.7. highlight the committee’s added value in dealings with the Organisation’s other bodies, with which effective and focused partnerships may be established to drive forward change in environmental monitoring and governance;
1. Assembly debate on 18 April 2024 (12th sitting) (see Doc. 15955, report of Committee on Social Affairs, Health andSustainable Development, rapporteur: Mr Simon Moutquin). Text adopted by the Assembly on 18 April 2024 (12th sitting).
Recommendations 2271 to 2274
4.8. set up a rapporteur group on environmental affairs at Committee of Ministers level to ensure unity and co-ordination in decision making.
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Recommendation 2273 (2024)1Provisional version
Towards Council of Europe strategies for healthy seas and oceans to counter the climate crisis
Parliamentary Assembly
1. The Parliamentary Assembly refers to its Resolution 2546 (2024) “Towards Council of Europestrategies for healthy seas and oceans to counter the climate crisis” and underscores the strategic goal tomake the link between human rights and the environment a visible priority of the Council of Europe throughthe Reykjavik process. The Council of Europe has undertaken to come up with its own response to the tripleplanetary crisis by initiating the Reykjavik process and recognising, at political level, the right to a healthy,clean and sustainable environment at the 4th Summit of Heads of State and Government. A healthyenvironment can never be possible without healthy seas and oceans. The Council of Europe must contributeto networking between like-minded partners and provide a forum for civil society and young people.
2. The Assembly welcomes the intention to strengthen the tools of the Council of Europe forenvironmental protection as part of the Reykjavik process, ensuring their sustainability through the provision ofstable resources. The member States should consolidate the Council of Europe capacity in this field andunderpin it with adequate long-term funding in follow-up to decisions of the Reykjavik Summit. The Council ofEurope should join forces with other international organisations, notably the European Union, in the realisationof the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and, in particular, SDG 14 which is aimed atconserving and sustainably using the oceans, seas and marine resources for responding in a holistic mannerto a host of direct and indirect threats including plastic and other marine pollution, ocean warming,eutrophication, acidification and the collapse of fisheries and biodiversity.
3. The Assembly therefore recommends that the Committee of Ministers:
3.1. take into account the need to ensure comprehensive, efficient and effective protection of oceansand seas when preparing strategic documents (such as the Strategy on the Environment and its relatedAction Plan) and in other relevant work such as co-operation and technical assistance activities,including with neighbouring countries;
3.2. in the development of the Council of Europe’s work on the environment, keep to the forefront thehuman rights perspective, including the right to a healthy environment, taking into account the needs ofall the different stakeholders in society including future generations;
3.3. take advantage of the Council of Europe observer status to the International MaritimeOrganisation (IMO) to raise awareness on the human rights perspective;
3.4. ensure close co-operation with civil society actors, NGOs working to protect the seas and savelives at sea, and relevant international organisations such as the IMO.
1. Assembly debate on 18 April 2024 (12th sitting) (see Doc. 15956, report of Committee on Social Affairs, Health andSustainable Development, rapporteur: Ms Yuliia Ovchynnykova). Text adopted by the Assembly on 18 April 2024(12th sitting).
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Recommendation 2274 (2024)1Provisional version
The protection of children against online violence
Parliamentary Assembly
1. The Parliamentary Assembly refers to its Resolution 2547 (2024) “The protection of children againstonline violence”. It invites the Committee of Ministers to take into due consideration, in its work, the dangersposed by the internet to children, who are more exposed to violence and new forms of violence in the onlineenvironment, in particular by:
1.1. considering and incorporating the best interests of the child in the Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence, Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law, including the protection of children’s human rights from the dangers of artificial intelligence;
1.2. taking online violence into account in its feasibility study on age-appropriate comprehensive sexuality education;
1.3. strengthening international co-operation with relevant organisations, including the European Commission and relevant European Union agencies such as Europol and the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, and Interpol, with a view to focusing attention on the protection of children’s human rights and the best interests of the child.
2. The Assembly calls on the Committee of Ministers to strengthen co-operation with digital industrystakeholders in order to find adaptable and sustainable solutions to protect children from online violence,including by:
2.1. as a first step, assessing the reliability of age verification tools, depending on the content and the age of child users;
2.2. providing children and parents with tools to raise awareness of the dangers of the internet;
2.3. making online tools available to enable easy reporting of incidents of online violence, and providing help and support, particularly psychological care, for child victims.
1. Assembly debate on 19 April 2024 (14th sitting) (see Doc. 15954, report of Committee on Social Affairs, Health andSustainable Development, rapporteur: Mr Joseph O'Reilly). Text adopted by the Assembly on 19 April 2024 (14th sitting).
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Resolution 2537 (2024)1Provisional version
Relationship between the parliamentary majority and the opposition in a democracy
Parliamentary Assembly
1. The promotion and consolidation of pluralist democracy are amongst the main objectives of the Councilof Europe and its Parliamentary Assembly. The member States of the Council of Europe shall endeavour todevelop common standards and practices aimed at promoting a free and pluralist parliamentary democracyand the means for their implementation in national parliaments.
2. In all national parliaments, there are provisions acknowledging the role of the opposition or theparliamentary minority in their dimension as political groups or individual parliamentarians not supporting thegovernment.
3. The best way of ensuring that the opposition discharges its responsibilities is to extend and preciselydefine its rights. However, in only a few Council of Europe member States do the laws or constitution explicitlymention the role of the opposition. Some constitutions recognise the opposition only in outline, leaving muchof the detail to be determined by ordinary legislation, statutory law or parliamentary rules of procedure, or byconvention, custom and tradition.
4. While there are considerable differences in the political and institutional cultures and components ofEuropean States, it is however possible to identify certain general principles which govern the relationshipbetween the parliamentary majority and its opposition and reflect the common European constitutionalheritage.
5. One major objective in parliamentary democracies is to create a situation where there is a sharedcommitment to the essentials of democracy by the majority and minority and a common desire to make “their”parliament work properly for the public good. There is still a long way to go before this objective is reached inthe wider Europe. A strengthened position of opposition in parliaments would be beneficial for the system ofchecks and balances in democracies.
6. More than any other forum, parliament is the place where democracy manifests itself, and in oursocieties there is hardly any debate that radically challenges the actual principle of representative democracy.Parliament is the institution that embodies society in the diversity of its composition and opinions and whichrelays and channels this diversity in the political process. Its vocation is to regulate tensions and maintainequilibrium between the competing claims of diversity and uniformity, individuality and collectivity, in order toenhance social cohesion and solidarity.
7. A democratic parliamentary system presumes an ethic of self-restraint on the part of the majority, withrespect for the rights and interests of the minority. Not all possible advantages should be taken, nor are theytaken in mature parliamentary systems. In parliaments where such a political culture exists, often with“unwritten” parliamentary conventions, the need for legal guarantees for the opposition and minority is less. Innew democracies, without such democratic traditions, the need for formal rules protecting the opposition mayoften be stronger.
1. Assembly debate on 15 April 2024 (9th sitting) (see Doc. 15946, report of Committee on Political Affairs andDemocracy, rapporteur: Ms Elvira Kovács). Text adopted by the Assembly on 15 April 2024 (9th sitting).
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8. Opposition rights are considered as an institutionalised power possessed by the opposition inparliament that encompasses and goes beyond rights of individual legislators to speak and vote againstgovernment bills. Enshrining and clearly defining rights and guarantees in law is an effective tool for thefunctioning of the parliamentary opposition. Institutional procedures, recognition, legitimisation andinstitutionalisation of the parliamentary opposition are integral to the idea of constitutional democracy itself andintegral part of the political culture.
9. The legitimisation of the parliamentary opposition in the constitution, laws as well as rules of procedure,provides, on the one hand, legal guarantees within government-opposition relations to limit the politicalinfluence of the parliamentary majority on the minority. On the other hand, by placing the opposition on anequal footing with the majority, it requires them to be jointly legally responsible for the exercise of power.
10. Effective opposition can help the government to avoid mistakes – or swiftly correct them – therebyimproving governance outcomes. So, the existence of an effective parliamentary opposition able to scrutinisethe policy of a governing majority is a visible symbol of the salvation of State political order and parliamentitself.
11. The Parameters on the Relationship between the Parliamentary Majority and the Opposition in aDemocracy: a checklist (“Checklist”) is the result of a long and careful work carried out by the EuropeanCommission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) which took its origin in Resolution 1601 (2008)“Procedural guidelines on the rights and responsibilities of the opposition in a democratic parliament” of theAssembly. The Venice Commission concluded that it is important to explore the ways and means by which therole of the parliamentary opposition can be formally better regulated and protected and that it is a worthyattempt to introduce soft regulations in an area which is essential for the proper functioning of parliamentarydemocracy. The use of the Checklist should be widely promoted amongst national parliaments, and theAssembly should contribute to this effort, directly and through its political groups.
12. In light of these considerations, the Assembly:
12.1. welcomes the elaboration of the Venice Commission Checklist on Parameters on theRelationship between the Parliamentary Majority and the Opposition in a Democracy: a Checklist, andendorses the Checklist as adopted;
12.2. disseminates and recommends the Checklist to the parliaments of the Council of Europemember and observer States, as well as to the parliaments enjoying observer or partner for democracystatus with the Assembly;
12.3. encourages member States to ensure that their democratic mechanisms are given politicallegitimacy through integrity, as trust in parliaments shapes both the stability and quality of democracy;only together can parliamentary majority and opposition create inclusive, prosperous and sustainablesocieties;
12.4. invites the parliaments of the member States of the Council of Europe to promote the Checklistand to take it into account when revising the relevant national rules or developing best practices;
12.5. encourages the parliaments of the member States of the Council of Europe to enter intodialogue about how to improve the existing national rules on the relationship between the parliamentarymajority and the opposition in a democracy;
13. As regards its own activities, the Assembly resolves to take into account the Checklist in its monitoringwork. It also resolves to play a greater role in promoting the Checklist by:
13.1. inviting its political groups to revise their statutory rules and rules of procedure, including provisions specifying the procedure and requirements for, and consequences of, switches in political affiliation as well as the suspension, expulsion or resignation of members;
13.2. encouraging its political groups to enhance discussions on how to improve the relationship between the parliamentary majority and the opposition in a democracy;
13.3. holding debates on how to develop the legal, including the soft law, environment and the best practices determining the relationship between the parliamentary majority and the opposition in a democracy;
13.4. stepping up interparliamentary co-operation activities addressing the improvement of the relationship between the parliamentary majority and the opposition in a democracy;
13.5. continuing to review, in co-operation with the Venice Commission, the Checklist and the issues raised in it, with a view to developing it further if required.
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Resolution 2538 (2024)1Provisional version
Promoting the revised Code of Good Practice on Referendums
Parliamentary Assembly
1. The Parliamentary Assembly refers to its Resolution 2251 (2019) “Updating guidelines to ensure fairreferendums in Council of Europe member States” in which, taking note that the process of revision of theguidelines had already started, it asked the European Commission for Democracy through Law (VeniceCommission) to take into account the increasing use of referendums, the rise of digital media and thechanged nature of political campaigning.
2. Through this text, the Assembly wished to provide an input to the work of the Venice Commission,having taken note that, in recent years, the process and/or the fairness of the outcome in a number of nationalreferendums had been questioned and that, in other cases, important innovations had been introduced, theknowledge of which could benefit legislators in all member States.
3. The Venice Commission emphasised the need for referendums to respect the rule of law and, inparticular, to comply with the legal system as a whole, especially with the procedural rules on constitutionalrevision. It also warned against the use of referendums to bypass important constitutional safeguards, such asthe requirement for a qualified majority in parliament. As regards the substance of the proposed changes, theVenice Commission was concerned that most of these referendums were aimed at concentrating powers andreducing democratic control by parliament. On that basis, the Venice Commission initiated the process ofrevision of the Code of Good Practice on Referendums and in June 2022 it adopted the Revised Code ofGood Practice on Referendums (“Revised Code”).
4. The Revised Code responds to the Assembly’s concerns and takes into account developments withrespect to a number of referendums which have been held by Council of Europe member States in recentyears.
5. The Revised Code declares that it “does not intend to determine whether and under whichcircumstances recourse to referendums is desirable as such. The answer to this question varies according tothe nature of the constitutional system and tradition. It belongs to national constitutional law to establishwhether referendums are at all foreseen, what their scope is, and what procedure must be followed to holdthem. However, a number of guarantees are necessary to ensure that they genuinely express the wishes ofthe electorate and do not go against international standards in the field of human rights, democracy and therule of law.”
6. The Revised Code includes the Guidelines on the Holding of Referendums as well as an ExplanatoryMemorandum, which refers, when necessary, to the various items of the Guidelines in order to elaborate ontheir content and background. The Guidelines contain the Principles of Europe’s electoral heritage, theconditions for implementing these principles, and specific rules.
7. The present resolution is intended to elaborate on those aspects of the guidelines that are specific toreferendums. Accordingly, it does not comment on the principles and general rules applicable to bothelections and referendums.
1. Assembly debate on 15 April 2024 (9th sitting) (see Doc. 15940, report of Committee on Political Affairs andDemocracy, rapporteur: Ms Isabel Meirelles). Text adopted by the Assembly on 15 April 2024 (9th sitting).
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8. The Revised Code applies to referendums at the different levels of the State structure (national,regional, local). However, it is mainly focused on national referendums. Its general rules are to be adapted tothe reality of local and regional referendums, in conformity with national constitutional traditions.
9. In light of these considerations, the Assembly:
9.1. welcomes the elaboration of the Revised Code of Good Practice on Referendums and endorses it as adopted;
9.2. decides to disseminate the Revised Code of Good Practice on Referendums and recommends it to the parliaments of the Council of Europe member and observer States, as well as to the parliaments enjoying observer or partner for democracy status with the Assembly;
9.3. invites parliaments and other relevant bodies of Council of Europe member States to promote the Revised Code of Good Practice on Referendums and to take it into account when revising the relevant national rules or developing best practices;
9.4. encourages parliaments and other relevant bodies of Council of Europe member States to enter into dialogue as to how to improve the existing national rules on referendums;
9.5. invites parliaments of Council of Europe member States to update their rules on referendums on the basis of the Revised Code of Good Practice on Referendums;
9.6. invites parliaments of the Council of Europe member States to develop best practices which would improve the legal and institutional environment for referendums;
9.7. invites the political groups in the Assembly to promote the Revised Code of Good Practice on Referendums.
10. As regards its own activities, the Assembly resolves to play a greater role in promoting the RevisedCode of Good Practice on Referendums by:
10.1. encouraging its political groups to enhance discussions on how to improve the legal framework for referendums;
10.2. holding debates on how to develop the legal, including the soft law, environment and best practices relating to referendums;
10.3. stepping up interparliamentary co-operation activities addressing the improvement of the legal framework for referendums;
10.4. creating a Parliamentary Assembly Network of Election Observers, notably to promote the Revised Code of Good Practice on Referendums and other Council of Europe standards in electoral matters, in line with the proposal to reinforce electoral activities endorsed by the Assembly in January 2024;
10.5. continuing to review, in co-operation with the Venice Commission, the Revised Code of Good Practice on Referendums and the issues raised in it, with a view to developing it further if required.
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Resolution 2539 (2024)1Provisional version
Support for the reconstruction of Ukraine
Parliamentary Assembly
1. The Parliamentary Assembly reiterates its deep concern at the extensive devastation and acutesuffering inflicted upon Ukraine and its people by the Russian Federation with its illegal war of aggressionwhich started in 2014, and escalated into a large-scale invasion in February 2022, resulting in severe humanand material losses, grave violations of human rights, and numerous war crimes.
2. The Council of Europe has led the way in expressing its solidarity with Ukraine and its people,condemning the Russian Federation’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and excluding the RussianFederation from its membership because of its serious violation of international law and statutory obligations.The Council of Europe has also shown leadership in setting up the Register of Damage Caused by theAggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, as a first step towards establishing a comprehensivesystem of accountability of the Russian Federation for its wrongful acts. Consistent with its steadfast resolveand its focus on democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, the Council of Europe should play a significantrole in supporting the reconstruction efforts in Ukraine, by recommending the seizure of Russian State assetsand their use in support of the reconstruction of Ukraine. This course of action would pursue a threefoldobjective: strengthening Ukraine; ensuring the accountability of the Russian Federation; and deterring againstany other future aggression.
3. The Assembly believes that it is crucial for the international community, working in concert, to addressthis challenge and ensure that the victims of the aggression, Ukraine and its citizens, receive the reparationsthey are owed, and that there is a path towards justice. As already called for by the Assembly in its Resolution2516 (2023) “Ensuring a just peace in Ukraine and lasting security in Europe”, this shall involve establishing “acomprehensive compensation mechanism, including an international commission for the examination ofclaims for damages recorded in the Register of Damage, and a compensation fund to pay out on decisions oncompensation for damage awarded by the commission, in particular by confiscating and otherwise using theRussian Federation’s assets to pay for damage caused by the war in Ukraine”.
4. The documented damages to Ukraine's infrastructure and economy caused by the RussianFederation's aggression had reached US$416 billion in June 2023. The plight of those who have had to fleeUkraine because of the war – an estimated 6.2 million people – is particularly concerning, as a humanitarianemergency in itself and also because it creates a ripple effect across borders, impacting neighbouringcountries and straining resources on a larger scale. In addition, it has been estimated that approximately 17.6million individuals in Ukraine needed humanitarian assistance in 2023, with 5.1 million people being internallydisplaced.
5. The Assembly acknowledges that the non-participation by the Russian Federation in internationaldispute settlements hinders the traditional legal channels for securing reparations. It affirms, however, theobligation of the aggressor State, the Russian Federation, to provide full compensation for the damage, loss,and injury caused by its internationally wrongful acts, including the destruction of infrastructure, loss of life,economic hardships, and other adverse effects, in accordance with the principles of international law. In this
1. Assembly debate on 16 April 2024 (10th sitting) (see Doc. 15932, report of the Committee on Political Affairs andDemocracy, rapporteur: Mr Lulzim Basha; and Doc. 15941, opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights,rapporteur: Mr Davor Ivo Stier). Text adopted by the Assembly on 16 April 2024 (10th sitting).
See also Recommendation 2271 (2024).
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6. The Assembly notes that several countries holding Russian sovereign assets have frozenapproximately US$300 billion in Russian State assets. The frozen Russian State financial assets must bemade available for the reconstruction of Ukraine. States holding these assets should co-operate and transferthem to an international compensation mechanism. Under international law, States possess the authority toenact countermeasures against a State that has seriously breached international law. Now is the time forCouncil of Europe member States to move from sanctions to countermeasures. The Assembly further notesthat countermeasures are intended to induce the offending State to cease its unlawful behaviour or to complywith its obligations arising from that conduct, such as paying compensation for damages caused. TheAssembly emphasises that the legitimacy of the recommended countermeasures remains unassailable withinthe framework of sovereign immunity.
7. The Assembly acknowledges the long-standing influence of certain Russian individuals, also referred toas oligarchs, in both domestic and international politics, shaped by their control over key industries andsubstantial assets abroad. This enabled them to influence various stakeholders in the European countries.Since the beginning of the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine in 2014, a number of enterprisesowned by these individuals have been co-operating with the Russian military-industrial complex. Given thisfact, the European Union, G7 countries and Australia introduced the “Russian Elites, Proxies & OligarchsTask Force” (“REPO Task Force”) in March 2022. The Assembly believes that the member States have towork on a similar mechanism to be able to address this issue.
8. The Assembly recognises the endeavours of the member States in imposing sanctions on Russianindividuals and enterprises who collaborate with the Russian military-industrial complex, particularly those inheavy industries that facilitate the production of various types of lethal weaponry. The Assembly believes thatthe member States should devise mechanisms for monitoring potential violations of the sanction regime,freezing such assets, and subsequently transferring them to the international fund for the reconstruction ofUkraine, all while upholding the principles of international law and respecting private property rights.
9. The Assembly believes that creating, under the auspices of the Council of Europe, an internationalcompensation fund as well as a compensation mechanism, as a separate international instrument mandatedto examine and adjudicate claims and/or pay compensation for damage, loss or injury caused by the RussianFederation’s internationally wrongful acts in or against Ukraine, would provide a structured way to assess andcompensate for the damages suffered by various stakeholders because of Russian Federation’s illegalinvasion of Ukraine. This compensation mechanism should cover a range of losses, including but not limitedto infrastructure damage, environmental impacts, economic losses incurred by companies and investors, andthe costs associated with hosting and supporting those who have been displaced by the aggression, inUkraine and outside.
10. The Assembly acknowledges that Russian politicians, propagandists, oligarchs and other warcollaborators have amassed significant wealth through their close ties to Vladimir Putin’s regime, and havebeen trying to influence the internal politics of the European countries, which makes them accomplices in theRussian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine. To ensure the personal liability of a particular individual,measures such as freezing and confiscating the assets and their allocation to the reconstruction of Ukraineshould be applied. Bearing in mind that certain countries have already introduced new legislation or amendedthe existing one, and in adherence to principles of private property and international law, the member Statesare encouraged to develop legislation and legal mechanisms to confiscate these assets.
11. As the already established Register of Damage undertakes the laborious process of recordingUkrainian losses in preparation for an international claims process, countries that have frozen Russian assetsshould transfer those assets to an international compensation fund. An international commission for theexamination of claims for the damages recorded in the register should be created to effectively address theclaims process.
12. In light of these considerations, the Assembly:
12.1. calls on Council of Europe member States and eligible non-member States to join the Registerof Damage if they have not yet done so;
respect, the Assembly recalls the 2001 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, the 2005 UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, and the United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/ES-11/5 of 14 November 2022 “Furtherance of remedy and reparation for aggression against Ukraine”, which recognises the need for the establishment of an international mechanism for reparation.
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12.2. calls for the establishment of an international compensation mechanism under the auspices of the Council of Europe to comprehensively address the damages incurred by natural and legal persons affected, including the State of Ukraine, due to the unlawful actions of the Russian Federation with its invasion of Ukraine;
12.3. urges Council of Europe member and non-member States holding Russian State assets to actively co-operate in the prompt transfer of these assets to the established international compensation mechanism, supports the efforts of the European Union and the United States and calls upon them and the G7 to act without delay in taking all necessary steps to ensure that all Russian Federation assets in their custody are made available for the recovery and reconstruction of Ukraine;
12.4. urges that the reconstruction of Ukraine is needed right away without waiting for the end of the aggression, therefore calling for the creation of an international trust fund with a clear deadline for the implementation of this mechanism, where all Russian State assets held by Council of Europe member and non-member States will be deposited, ensuring transparency, accountability, and equity in the disbursement of funds that should be used for compensation to Ukraine and natural and legal persons affected by the Russian aggression in Ukraine;
12.5. calls for the establishment of an impartial and effective international claims commission, operating under recognised judicial norms, to adjudicate claims presented by Ukraine, affected entities, as well as natural and legal persons seeking reparation for damages caused by the Russian Federation's aggression;
12.6. stresses the utmost importance of adhering to established international legal standards and principles in the transfer and management of frozen Russian assets, ensuring fairness and proportionality, and safeguarding the rights of all affected parties as guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights (ETS No. 5) and/or other international human rights law instruments;
12.7. supports the recourse to countermeasures, as outlined within the framework of international law, to induce compliance by the Russian Federation with its international legal obligations and responsibilities;
12.8. invites States concerned about breaches of erga omnes obligations to actively participate in the compensation mechanism, contributing to efforts aimed at halting breaches and ensuring just reparations for affected natural and legal persons, as well as the State of Ukraine;
12.9. encourages collaborative efforts among member States, international organisations, and all relevant stakeholders to expedite the process of reconstruction and to ensure comprehensive compensation for the multifaceted damages caused by the war of aggression of the Russian Federation, including by considering other complementary or alternative proposals such as the confiscation of private assets following a criminal conviction for sanctions violations, introducing windfall taxes on the interest or profits derived from frozen Russian State assets, or using these assets as collateral for loans to Ukraine;
12.10. calls on member States, international organisations and all relevant stakeholders to continue working on expanding the list of the sanctioned individuals and companies who are directly or indirectly affiliated with the Russian defence industry, particularly in metallurgical and other types of heavy industry, and those who are contributing to the development of Russian military-industrial complex;
12.11. calls for a unified and resolute front against aggression, emphasising the shared responsibility of the international community in upholding global norms, preventing violations of international law, and promoting lasting peace and stability.
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Resolution 2540 (2024)1Provisional version
Alexei Navalny's death and the need to counter Vladimir Putin's totalitarian regime and its war on democracy
Parliamentary Assembly
1. The Parliamentary Assembly pays tribute to the courage and sacrifice of Alexei Navalny, a leadingRussian opposition politician, civil society activist, anti-corruption campaigner and political prisonerpersecuted, and ultimately killed, by the Russian State for his opposition to Vladimir Putin’s regime. TheAssembly expresses its heartfelt condolences to the family, associates and supporters of Mr Navalny.
2. Vladimir Putin has been in power in the Russian Federation as President or Prime Minister withoutinterruption since 2000, and the amendments to the Russian Constitution adopted in July 2020 andrecognised as illegitimate by the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission)and the Assembly allow him to remain in office until 2036. Since coming to power, Vladimir Putin has beenconstructing a regime whose aim is to wage a war against democracy and redraw the European and globalorder established after the collapse of the former Soviet Union. Occupation of Transnistria, invasion ofGeorgia in 2008, the war in Ukraine since 2014, the illegal annexation and occupation of territories, thedestruction of freedom of expression inside the Russian Federation, the disinformation war around the world,the persecution and assassination of its political opponents inside and outside the Russian Federation and thecreation of a system of legislation that criminalises political views are just a few but not all of the features ofVladimir Putin’s regime. The unlawful imprisonment and, as a result, the death of Alexei Navalny is acontinuation of the policy of Vladimir Putin's regime and its war against democracy.
3. On 16 February 2024, Mr Navalny died in a remote Siberian maximum security prison camp, FKU IK-3,where he was serving a manifestly arbitrary prison sentence. The official cause of his death was “suddendeath syndrome”. Mr Navalny’s family was prevented from gaining rapid and timely access to his body orhaving an independent autopsy carried out. Allegations emerged that Mr Navalny had been ill-treated byprison staff the day before his death. Three days after Mr Navalny’s death, the deputy director of the Russianprison service, Valery Boyarinev, was promoted to the rank of colonel general. Several days later, RomanVidyukov, the chief investigator in cases against Mr Navalny and his Anti-Corruption Foundation, waspromoted to deputy head of the State Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation. On 18 March 2022,Vladimir Putin claimed that he had agreed to swap the opposition leader in a prisoner exchange days beforehe died – a claim that Mr Navalny’s family strongly rejects.
4. During the three years of his unlawful imprisonment, imposed in blatant disregard of the RussianFederation’s obligations under Articles 3, 5, 6, 7, 18, 34 and 46 of the European Convention on Human Rights(ETS No. 5), under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and under the Convention againstTorture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Mr Navalny was subjected tosystemic torture and other forms of ill-treatment, such as the denial of sleep, repeated placement in isolationcell in inhuman and degrading conditions, and lack of access to proper medical care.
1. Assembly debate on 17 April 2024 (11th sitting) (see Doc. 15966, report of the Committee on Legal Affairs andHuman Rights, rapporteur: Mr Emanuelis Zingeris). Text adopted by the Assembly on 17 April 2024 (11th sitting).
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5. The Assembly considers that the Russian State bears full responsibility for the killing of Alexei Navalny,who was subjected to torture, inhuman and degrading treatment in violation of the judgments and interimmeasures of the European Court of Human Rights, and who had moreover survived an assassination attemptwith a chemical weapon, perpetrated in 2020 by a squad of FSB (the Russian Federation’s Federal SecurityService) assassins.
6. Mr Navalny has become the latest critic of Vladimir Putin to die at the hands of, or with at the least thetacit approval of, the Russian apparatus of oppression. For the past two decades, individuals who haveopposed Vladimir Putin’s iron grip on the Russian Federation have been killed, usually with the involvement ofthe Russian secret services or persons acting at their behest. The list of the regime’s victims includes, amongothers, journalists Anna Politkovskaya, Natalia Estemirova, Stanislav Markelov and Anastasia Baburova;Sergei Magnitsky – a lawyer murdered for exposing large scale corruption among the highest echelons of theRussian Government; Alexander Litvinenko – a former FSB officer who defected to the United Kingdom; andBoris Nemtsov – a deputy Prime Minister who challenged Vladimir Putin’s rule and whose circumstances ofdeath remain unclear, as noted by the Assembly in its Resolution 2297 (2019). Hundreds more innocenthuman rights defenders and opposition figures remain imprisoned on trumped-up charges and can beconsidered political prisoners as defined by Resolution 1900 (2012), including Vladimir Kara-Murza, IlyaYashin and Oleg Orlov. An independent journalist who covered the trial of Mr Navalny and recorded his finalcourt appearance on 15 February 2024, Antonina Favorskaya, was arbitrarily detained on charges of“extremism” and faces a lengthy prison sentence. The human rights organisation OVD-Info reports that thereare now over 1 000 political prisoners in the Russian Federation.
7. The Assembly deplores that acts of torture such as those to which Mr Navalny was exposed aresystemically applied against political prisoners in the Russian Federation, Ukrainian political prisoners illegallydetained in Russian prisons since 2014 and Ukrainian prisoners of war, as stated in its Resolution 2528(2024). According to the United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, the majority ofUkrainians in Russian captivity have been subjected to torture, rape, threats of sexual violence, deprivation offood and sleep and other forms of ill-treatment.
8. The Assembly recalls that the obligation to take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or othermeasures to prevent acts of torture, as enshrined in Article 2(1) of the Convention against Torture and OtherCruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, is unconditional and that no exceptionalcircumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any otherpublic emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.
9. Some of the persons directly responsible for and participating in the persecution and torture of AlexeiNavalny are well known. A detailed list can be found via this link: “Navalny list”. It includes prison staff, policeofficers, prosecutors and judges involved in their respective roles in the gross abuse of the Russian justicesystem for the purpose of punishing Mr Navalny for his political activism and creating a chilling effect withinRussian society.
10. On 13 October 2023 and in the following days, an open attack on Alexei Navalny's lawyers began:Alexei Lipster, Vadim Kobzev and Igor Sergunin were detained on remand in Moscow. Olga Mikhailova(senior lawyer of Alexei Navalny) and Alexander Fedulov, who were abroad at the time, were subject to anarrest warrant. Criminal cases on trumped-up charges have been initiated against them and some of theiroffices were searched, in manifest breach of legal professional privilege, establishing an even more hostileenvironment for providing an effective legal defence in the Russian Federation.
11. The persons on this list should be included in the sanctions lists naming individuals, which are or maybe established under existing and future Magnitsky-type sanctions laws.
12. Under Vladimir Putin’s rule, the Russian Federation has become a de facto dictatorship. Not only has itstifled democratic opposition inside the Russian Federation: it has also failed to respect the democraticchoices of neighbouring States and their political independence. By invading Georgia in 2008, unlawfullyannexing the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the City of Sevastopol, and violently occupying parts of theDonetsk and Luhansk Oblasts in 2014, interfering in foreign electoral processes and, finally, by launching itsfull-scale war of aggression against Ukraine in February 2022 and threatening those assisting Ukraine’s self-defence with nuclear war, the regime of Vladimir Putin has fully committed to war on democracy. By doing so,it seeks to re-establish the former Soviet sphere of influence and take revenge on States which rejected itstotalitarianism in favour of democracy and human rights.
13. Vladimir Putin’s regime has committed to the neo-imperialistic ideology of Russkiy Mir (the “Russianworld”), which the Kremlin has turned into a tool for promoting war. This ideology is being used to destroy theremnants of democracy, to militarise Russian society and to justify external aggression to expand the Russian
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Federation’s borders to include all territories once under Russian domination, including Ukraine. The hierarchy of the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church, including Patriarch Kirill, has been championing the Russkiy Mir ideology, declaring the war against Ukraine and the “satanic” West as a “holy war of all Russians”, urging Orthodox believers to sacrifice themselves for their country. The Assembly is appalled by such an abuse of religion and the distortion of the Christian Orthodox tradition by Vladimir Putin's regime and its proxies in the Moscow Patriarchate hierarchy. The Assembly condemns such rhetoric and emphasises that incitement to commit the crime of aggression, genocide and war crimes is a crime in itself. The Assembly calls on all States to treat Patriarch Kirill and the Russian Orthodox hierarchy as an ideological extension of Vladimir Putin’s regime complicit in war crimes and crimes against humanity conducted in the name of the Russian Federation and the Russkiy Mir ideology.
14. On 17 March 2024, Vladimir Putin was declared the winner of the so-called presidential election, whichfrom the outset was not free and fair, with no genuine opponent to Vladimir Putin even being permitted to run.Moreover, polling stations for this election were opened in sovereign Ukrainian territory temporarily occupiedby the Russian Federation and in the Moldovan Administrative-Territorial Units of the Left Bank of theDniester, in gross violation of the United Nations Charter and the principle of sovereignty, politicalindependence and territorial integrity of all States.
15. In line with its Resolution 2519 (2023), the Assembly does not recognise the legitimacy of VladimirPutin as the President of the Russian Federation and reiterates its call on Council of Europe member andobserver States and the European Union to cease all contact with him, except for humanitarian purposes andin the pursuit of peace. The Assembly recalls that the abolition of presidential term limits for the benefit ofVladimir Putin violates not only the Russian Constitution but also well-established international legalprinciples.
16. The Assembly considers that the Russian Federation has gradually transformed into a State whichtoday bars the existence of any political opposition. By means of fascist-style propaganda, it has introduced acult of personality around the figure of Vladimir Putin. Through the abuse of the criminal justice system, theregime has suppressed any political and media pluralism; civil society can no longer exist exceptunderground; and the regime is enforcing mass conformity, including through the indoctrination of children. Itpresents to its people a dangerous vision of a Russia which rallies around imperialistic conquest, going as faras to threaten its perceived enemies with nuclear annihilation. All these phenomena, combined with anomnipresent security apparatus, mass surveillance of society and brutal repression against peaceful protests,have turned the Russian Federation into what the Assembly considers a totalitarian State, whose modusoperandi resembles that of a criminal organisation.
17. As the Russian Federation is a federation only formally, the regime of Vladimir Putin has also declaredwar on its own people. In particular, indigenous peoples, national and ethnic minorities in the RussianFederation are forcibly russified and subjected to repression and discrimination, in violation of the RussianFederation’s obligations under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of RacialDiscrimination. In particular, the Assembly notes the disproportionately high losses suffered by military unitscomposed of soldiers conscripted from national, ethnic and indigenous populations. The Assembly considersthis to be a deliberate campaign, aimed at eliminating national and ethnic diversity within the RussianFederation.
18. The Assembly strongly condemns the Russia Federation’s practice of including political opponents ofthe regime on lists of terrorists and extremists: opposition politicians, cultural figures, journalists and civilactivists, leading to further misuse of the Interpol system. Vladimir Putin's order to the Russian FSB to takedecisive measures against the “enemies of the country” both inside and outside of it is also of great concern.In practice, this could lead to a wave of politically motivated assassinations and murders on the territory ofCouncil of Europe member States.
19. Urgent and co-ordinated measures are the only means to counter Vladimir Putin’s totalitarian regimeand its war on democracy. Ukraine must immediately receive the weapons and ammunition that it needs toeffectively defend itself and to succeed in repelling the Russian invaders.
20. The Assembly further considers that sanctions against the Russian Federation must be reinforced tohinder its economy from continuing to finance its illegal war of aggression. The Assembly welcomes theproposal by Ms Yuliya Navalnaya to apply the tools developed for fighting organised crime against theenablers of Vladimir Putin’s criminal regime, namely to conduct investigations into their financial machinations,search for their associates, lawyers and financiers in Council of Europe member States and beyond, in orderto prevent the regime from hiding behind corporate veils and a network of shell companies.
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21. The Assembly deplores the fact that despite the imposition of an unprecedented sanctions regime,some of the Russian Federation’s trading partners continue to enable it to gain access to westerntechnologies and capital, allowing it to manufacture cruise missiles and drones that are used indiscriminatelyto attack Ukrainian cities, residential areas, hospitals and critical infrastructures. By way of example, theAssembly is concerned about the sharp increase in the import of microchips by Kazakhstan accompanied bya similar rise of exports of microchips from Kazakhstan to the Russian Federation. It is equally alarmed by thelarge quantities of crude oil being exported from the Russian Federation to India and then sold onwards to theWest.
22. The Assembly further condemns States that continue to support the Russian disinformation campaign,in particular by justifying its manifestly unlawful war of aggression on Ukraine, spread at various internationalfora, including the United Nations General Assembly and Human Rights Council, in particular Belarus, Iran,Cuba, North Korea, Venezuela, as well as others, thus undermining democracy worldwide.
23. At the same time, the Assembly welcomes reports that banks in Armenia, Kazakhstan and Hong Konghave begun refusing payments from Russian companies for electronics delivered to the Russian Federation. Itencourages all States and financial institutions to closely monitor all transactions with Russian entities toensure the effectiveness of the sanctioning mechanism.
24. The Assembly welcomes the approval on 12 March 2024 of a new European Union Directive tostrengthen the enforcement of European Union sanctions across member States by criminalising the violationand circumvention of sanctions. It also welcomes the recent inclusion of dozens of individuals involved in thepersecution of Alexei Navalny in the list of human rights violators sanctioned under the European Unionhuman rights sanctions regime, proposed now to be renamed after Alexei Navalny.
25. The Assembly considers that further restrictions are necessary to prevent the Russian economy fromsustaining the war against Ukraine. In particular, the Assembly notes that the Russian crude oil price capsanctions have had limited effect. Lack of sufficient control and deterrence mechanisms has permitted theRussian Federation to mitigate the effects of the sanctions, in particular by using a fleet of “shadow” tankersand because the price cap on Russian crude oil is still set at a too high a level.
26. The Assembly therefore:
26.1. urges the Russian Federation to:
26.1.1. allow an independent and transparent international investigation into Alexei Navalny’s death, including through an international commission of inquiry, which could be established by United Nations bodies or other international organisations;
26.1.2. cease persecuting family members, associates and supporters of Alexei Navalny in the Russian Federation and abroad;
26.1.3. release all prisoners currently detained in the Russian Federation for the purpose of silencing them and deterring other critics of the regime from protesting or speaking out;
26.2. calls on the European Union and all States having Magnitsky-type targeted sanctions laws to include in their sanctions lists the persons directly responsible for, and participating in, the persecution, ill-treatment and death of Alexei Navalny and invites all States that have not yet adopted such laws to do so without further delay;
26.3. calls on all States to ensure that the Russian Federation is held accountable for its systemic use of torture and other forms of ill-treatment to which Mr Navalny and thousands of other prisoners in the Russian Federation, including Ukrainian prisoners of war, have been subjected, by having recourse to the dispute settlement mechanism stipulated in Article 30 (1) of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment;
26.4. calls on all States to put pressure on the Russian Federation to allow independent international bodies to monitor the reported political prisoners' state of health and conditions of detention, pending their release or re-examination of their cases;
26.5. encourages member and observer States of the Council of Europe to pursue prisoner exchanges in order to obtain the release of political prisoners in the Russian Federation and Belarus, prioritising Vladimir Kara-Murza and others who have serious health conditions (noting in particular the potential role of Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America);
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26.6. reiterates its call to set up an international mechanism to compensate the victims of the Russian aggression against Ukraine, to which frozen Russian assets should be promptly transferred, and to set up a special international tribunal to investigate and prosecute the political and military leadership of the Russian Federation for the crime of aggression against Ukraine.
26.7. calls on the European Union and the G7 group to further strengthen the sanctions regime against the Russian Federation, a State sponsor of terrorism, in particular by:
26.7.1. significantly strengthening the sanctions regime by lowering the oil and gas price cap, considering that the revenue from oil and gas exports is still a significant source of income for the Russian State budget;
26.7.2. imposing secondary sanctions on States, natural and legal persons that knowingly enable the Russian Federation to evade the full effects of sanctions imposed on its economy, including by exporting technology, munitions, dual-use goods for military use, and other resources used by the Russian Federation to sustain its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine;
26.7.3. setting up a Register of States, natural and legal persons aiding and abetting the Russian Federation in evading sanctions, including by enabling it to obtain dual-use goods for military use;
26.7.4. enforcing the existing mandatory “oil spill insurance” requirements for all tankers passing through their waters to promote compliance with the price cap sanctions and protect the environment from oil spills by ageing and insufficiently insured tankers;
26.7.5. cutting off any services provided to the Russian oil and gas industry in order to restrict its future liquefied natural gas production and increase the costs of oil extraction in the Russian Federation;
26.7.6. imposing sanctions on the Moscow Exchange as well as Rosatom – a State-owned nuclear energy monopoly that has taken control of Europe’s largest nuclear plant in Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia region, using this as a tool of blackmail against Europe by raising the threat of nuclear disaster;
26.7.7. emphasising that under international humanitarian law, the Russian oil refineries could be considered legitimate targets of military attacks;
26.8. calls on the United States of America – a Council of Europe observer State – to ensure that the Senate’s foreign aid bill, which includes military aid for Ukraine, is put to a vote without further delay or otherwise to authorise the delivery of the necessary military and other aid for Ukraine as soon as possible;
26.9. encourages the Council of Europe member and observer States to share amongst themselves all intelligence pertaining to the Russian Federation’s interference in electoral processes, including its disinformation campaigns, in order to identify and prevent further such practices;
26.10. calls on the Council of Europe member and observer States and the European Union to strengthen the effects of Resolution 2519 (2023) by formally recognising Vladimir Putin’s illegitimacy as President of the Russian Federation;
26.11. calls on the Council of Europe member States who are not members of the European Union to align themselves with sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation and its allies under the European Union human rights sanctions regime;
26.12. calls on the Council of Europe member and observer States, the European Union and the United Nations to draw attention to the numerous violations of human rights and the rights of peoples to the detriment of the colonised indigenous peoples of the Russian Federation;
26.13. calls on all States to apply to Vladimir Putin’s regime the existing anti-money laundering legislation aimed at combating organised crime and the financing of terrorism, to identify any private or legal persons that can be classified as enablers and impose harsh penalties thereon, including the confiscation of assets; and in particular to adopt, where lacking, and apply legislation permitting non-conviction based confiscation of illegal assets, with a reversal of the burden of proof, as recommended by the Assembly in Resolution 2218 (2018);
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26.14. encourages the Council of Europe member and observer States and the European Union to recognise that the Russian Orthodox Church is in fact being used as an instrument of Russian influence and propaganda by the Kremlin regime and has nothing to do with the freedom of religion and the freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;
26.15. calls on the Council of Europe member and observer States and the European Union to strengthen the sanctioning mechanism against Aleksandr Lukashenka’s regime in Belarus, which has allowed the Russian Federation to use its territory for the offensive against Kyiv in 2022 and which continues to support the war of aggression against Ukraine.
27. The Assembly expresses its solidarity and commitment to pursue dialogue with Russian and Belarusiandemocratic forces which share the values of the Council of Europe and recognise the rules-basedinternational order, including the respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. In this regard,the Assembly recalls its decision – set out in its Resolution 2530 (2023) “A democratic future for Belarus” – toset up a General Rapporteur for a Democratic Belarus and to allow a representative delegation of Belarusiandemocratic forces to take an active role in some of its work.
28. The Assembly states, to reinforce European Parliament Resolution of 29 February 2024 on the murderof Alexei Navalny and the need for EU action in support of political prisoners and oppressed civil society inRussia (2024/2579(RSP)), that decolonisation of the Russian Federation is a necessary condition for theestablishment of democracy in the Russian Federation.
29. Likewise, the Assembly welcomes the initiative, taken by the President of the Assembly and endorsedby the Bureau of the Assembly in October 2023 to set up a Contact platform for dialogue with Russiandemocratic forces and calls for setting up a General Rapporteur on the Russian democratic forces.
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Resolution 2541 (2024)1Provisional version
The arbitrary detention of Vladimir Kara-Murza and the systematic persecution of anti-war protesters in the Russian Federation and Belarus
Parliamentary Assembly
1. The Parliamentary Assembly is appalled by the arbitrary detention of Vladimir Kara-Murza and thesystematic persecution of anti-war protesters in the Russian Federation and Belarus.
2. In regard to the Russian Federation, the Assembly recalls that judgments of the European Court ofHuman Rights concerning events prior to February 2022 already demonstrated a severe repression of thefreedoms of speech, assembly, and association, and the right to liberty.
3. Beginning in March 2022, the Russian Federation rapidly adopted a series of draconian amendments tothe Criminal Code and the Code of Administrative Offences, to silence criticism of its illegal, brutal, full-scalewar of aggression against Ukraine. These legislative amendments are not consistent with international humanrights standards and have effectively criminalised all forms of dissent against the war and against the actionsof the Russian military. These actions form a part of Vladimir Putin’s systemic war on democracy.
4. One of the first victims of this repression was historian, politician, and winner of the 2022 Václav HavelHuman Rights Prize, Vladimir Kara-Murza. Mr Kara-Murza was arrested and detained on 12 April 2022. Hewas subsequently charged with spreading “deliberate false information” about the actions of the Russianmilitary in Ukraine, “organising the activities of an undesirable organisation”, and high treason. On 17 April2023 Mr Kara-Murza was sentenced to 25 years in prison.
5. Mr Kara-Murza barely survived two previous poisoning attacks linked to the Russian authorities whichhave had lasting negative effects on his health. As a result of his pre-trial detention, Mr Kara-Murza’spolyneuropathy, caused by these poisoning attacks, has deteriorated significantly. For the last six months,Mr Kara-Murza has been held in complete isolation of solitary confinement in a cell, first in a strict-regimeprison colony and then in a Siberian “special-regime” prison colony, the harshest grade in the RussianFederation’s penitentiary system. Since September 2023 he has not been receiving medical treatment and hispolyneuropathy is slowly deteriorating.
6. There have been countless other examples of politically motivated prosecutions in the RussianFederation against individuals who speak out against the war. The most minor acts of peaceful speech orprotest can now incur hefty fines, detention, and lengthy prison sentences. There has been a significant rise inthe number of political prisoners, as defined by Resolution 1900 (2012). In Resolution 2446 (2022) theAssembly stated that there were 478 political prisoners in the Russian Federation. The human rightsorganisation OVD-Info reports that there are now over 1 000. The organisation reports that almost 20 000people have been detained for their anti-war stance in the Russian Federation and the occupied territory ofCrimea since February 2022.
1. Assembly debate on 17 April 2024 (11th sitting) (see Doc. 15967, report of the Committee on Legal Affairs andHuman Rights, rapporteur: Ms Thórhildur Sunna Ævarsdóttir). Text adopted by the Assembly on 17 April 2024(11th sitting).
https://pace.coe.int
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7. Meanwhile, the Assembly notes that the anti-war movement in the Russian Federation has not beeneradicated. Instead, it has gone underground. Russians who oppose the war have adapted their activities tothe current situation, so that they can continue some forms of anti-war dissent, without exposing themselvesto immediate arrest and indefinite imprisonment.
8. The Assembly reiterates that the persecution of individuals with an anti-war stance gives rise to multipleviolations of the European Convention on Human Rights (ETS No. 5), to which the Russian Federation wasstill bound until 16 September 2022, and to breaches of other international human rights treaties to which theRussian Federation is party, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
9. There has similarly been a widespread repression of anti-war protesters in Belarus. Credible reportssuggest that, against a backdrop of generalised political repression in the country, more than 1 600 peoplehave been detained for their anti-war stance. Most of these detentions occurred in the immediate aftermath ofthe full-scale invasion, when anti-war protests were brutally dispersed. Subsequently, even the smallestexpressions of sentiments against the war have been met with prosecution, often through the application oflegislation on “extremism”, the terms of which violate international human rights standards.
10. Many Belarusians have taken a stand through actions such as disseminating information about militarymovements or infrastructure, damaging railway tracks to prevent movement of military equipment andpersonnel, or sabotaging military installations. These actions have been met with a manifestlydisproportionate reaction, through prosecutions under terrorism charges.
11. The Assembly is shocked by the numerous credible reports of torture being inflicted upon individualswith an anti-war stance in Belarus, alongside other repressive measures such as months in punishment cells(without any blankets, clothes, books, or amenities), refusals of access to medicine, and other forms of ill-treatment. The use of incommunicado detention, whereby political prisoners are completely cut off from theoutside world, has become particularly common. This is an incredibly cruel and inhumane practice, punishingnot only the prisoner but their loved ones too.
12. The Assembly draws a distinction between on the one hand the Governments of the RussianFederation and Belarus and on the other, the people of these two countries. In this respect, it expresses itssolidarity with the many Russians and Belarusians who speak out against the war of aggression, recognisingthat they do so in a context of severe repression and that they risk serious personal consequences.
13. The Assembly therefore calls on the Russian Federation and Belarus to:
13.1. cease the threats, intimidation and prosecution of individuals who have been targeted due totheir anti-war stance, and ensure the immediate release of those who are in detention;
13.2. pending their release, ensure that the conditions of detention of all such prisoners are compliantwith international human rights law (including access to adequate medical care, and contact with theirlawyers, families and others);
13.3. ensure that prisoners are not subjected to torture or ill-treatment, that any such allegations areinvestigated promptly and effectively and that perpetrators are prosecuted;
13.4. reverse the measures taken against media and civil society organisations which have beensubjected to closure, liquidation, website blocking, or registration as “foreign agents” or “undesirableorganisations” as a result of perceived anti-war activities;
13.5. repeal the laws enacted with the purpose of repressing anti-war sentiment;
13.6. implement relevant recommendations and decisions issued by international organisations ofwhich they are member States, such as the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and human rights treaty bodies which are competent to deal with individualcommunications against them.
14. Furthermore, the Assembly calls on the Russian Federation to:
14.1. adopt without delay effective general measures to address the structural and systemic problemsidentified by the European Court of Human Rights and the Committee of Ministers of the Council ofEurope with regard to freedom of assembly, freedom of expression, freedom of association, and theright to liberty in the Russian Federation, including by repealing or amending relevant legislation, suchas the laws on “foreign agents”, “undesirable organisations” and those designed to censor discussionabout the war in Ukraine;
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14.2. in accordance with the decision of the Committee of Ministers in the Navalnyy and Ofitserov group at its 1492nd DH meeting held in March 2024, ensure the release of all prisoners currently detained in the Russian Federation in abuse of power and for the purpose of silencing them and deterring other critics of the regime from protesting or speaking out;
14.3. co-operate with the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT), as long as the Russian Federation remains a Party to the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (ETS No. 126), thereby allowing for the monitoring of the reported political prisoners’ state of health, conditions of detention pending their release and allegations of torture and ill-treatment.
15. The Assembly further recalls that the Russian Federation refuses to pay just satisfaction awarded bythe European Court of Human Rights for both individual and interstate cases. The Assembly resolves toexplore other possible avenues to secure the payment of such awards, calling on member and observerStates, as well as the European Union, to do the same.
16. Noting the need to provide the Russian and Belarusian anti-war movements with greater recognitionand support, the Assembly calls on member and observer States of the Council of Europe to:
16.1. publicly highlight the continuation and ongoing work of the Russian and Belarusian anti-war movements;
16.2. implement programmes of international solidarity with the Russian and Belarusian anti-war movements, including by organising events, promoting media coverage, academic research, conferences and roundtables, and supporting artistic endeavours;
16.3. explore further steps to provide information to the Russian population by cutting through the Kremlin’s information blockade, including by providing:
16.3.1. a welcoming environment for independent Russian news outlets, including their registration as legal entities and the facilitation of their ongoing work;
16.3.2. any necessary financial support to independent Russian news outlets;
16.3.3. facilitation of the entry and stay of independent Russian journalists and social media influencers;
16.3.4. financial and other support to Russian anti-war social media influencers;
16.3.5. free and stable VPNs (Virtual private networks) for the Russian population;
16.4. support Russian and Belarusian civil society organisations located abroad in their efforts to legally and financially support anti-war protesters within the Russian Federation and Belarus;
16.5. prevent businesses from refusing to supply goods and services to independent Russian and Belarusian civil society organisations supporting anti-war causes or the defence of human rights, by enforcing relevant national laws and regulations and/or strengthening them as necessary;
16.6. prevent the application of international sanctions to independent Russian and Belarusian civil society organisations supporting anti-war causes or the defence of human rights, including financial and banking sanctions.
17. Alarmed by the dire conditions of imprisonment of Vladimir Kara-Murza and other individuals detainedfor their anti-war stance, the Assembly calls on:
17.1. member and observer States of the Council of Europe to deploy diplomatic efforts to secure the release of political prisoners in the Russian Federation and Belarus who have opposed the war of aggression against Ukraine, prioritising Vladimir Kara-Murza and others who have serious health conditions;
17.2. member and observer States of the Council of Europe to pursue prisoner exchanges in order to obtain the release of political prisoners in the Russian Federation and Belarus who have opposed the war of aggression against Ukraine, prioritising Vladimir Kara-Murza and others who have serious health conditions (noting in particular the potential role of Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America);
17.3. the United States of America to recognise Mr Kara-Murza as a “wrongfully detained person” under the Levinson Act, with a view to intensifying the activities of the Government of the United States to secure Mr Kara-Murza’s release.
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18.1. promoting the adoption of a resolution of the Human Rights Council and releasing a joint statement, calling for the release of anti-war protesters in the Russian Federation and Belarus, an end to the political persecution of anti-war protesters in the Russian Federation and Belarus, and condemning the failure of the Russian Federation and Belarus to implement rulings of international bodies relating to the repression of anti-war protesters, including judgments and decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (in respect of the Russian Federation), the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, and the United Nations treaty bodies;
18.2. calling for a country visit to the Russian Federation and Belarus of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the Special Rapporteurs on human rights in the Russian Federation and Belarus, and other relevant bodies, to visit prisons and meet with anti-war protesters subject to political persecution, prioritising those with serious health conditions, including Vladimir Kara-Murza.
19. Noting the highly precarious situation of Russians and Belarusians with an anti-war stance who aretrying to flee their oppressive regimes, and recalling Resolution 2446 (2022) and Resolution 2499 (2023), theAssembly calls on member and observer States of the Council of Europe to:
19.1. support persons fleeing the Russian Federation and Belarus by facilitating their legal entry and stay, freedom of movement, safety and security, access to education, culture, financial services and pursuit of economic activities. This should include appropriate measures relating to emergency entry, emergency passports, visas, temporary and long-term residence permits, socio-economic assistance, and (when appropriate) refugee status;
19.2. examine the creation of separate international frameworks or networks for those fleeing the Russian Federation and Belarus, to deal with the issues of entry and stay of persons;
19.3. refuse extradition requests for Belarusian and Russian nationals, which could be considered to be politically motivated;
19.4. refrain from deporting back to their home countries Russian and Belarusian nationals who have demonstrated an anti-war stance concerning the aggression against Ukraine and who would thus be at genuine risk of political persecution or conscription to the Russian military;
19.5. take measures to address the refusal of the Belarusian authorities to issue passports in their consulates abroad (as well as prepare for the possibility of the Russian Federation doing so), through the recognition of de facto statelessness, and the issuing of travel documents to allow Belarusian (and if necessary, Russian) individuals at risk of political persecution or conscription to remain in European States after the expiration of their passports;
19.6. take measures to protect Russians and Belarusians who have fled their States from transnational repression carried out by their governments, as highlighted in Resolution 2509 (2023).
20. The Assembly further calls on member and observer States of the Council of Europe to introducerestrictive measures (in particular, sanctions under their “Magnitsky laws”) against individuals involved in thepolitical persecution of Russians and Belarusians because of their anti-war stance.
21. Noting the harm caused to Russian and Belarusian independent civil society by the application ofdomestic and international sanctions, the Assembly calls on private businesses:
21.1. to continue to provide goods and services to independent Russian and Belarusian civil society organisations that support anti-war causes or the defence of human rights;
21.2. to refuse to comply with the orders of the Russian and Belarusian Governments to block websites, social media accounts or other online resources of independent Russian and Belarusian civil society organisations that support anti-war causes or the defence of human rights.
22. The Assembly invites the European Court of Human Rights to continue examining pending and futurecases against the Russian Federation in respect of alleged violations of the Convention committed until16 September 2022, in particular and as a matter of priority those brought by applicants who have beenpersecuted for their anti-war stance.
23. The Assembly reiterates its call on Interpol to be particularly vigilant when dealing with requests for RedNotices from the Russian National Central Bureau that may be politically motivated, taking into accountResolution 2315 (2019) “Interpol reform and extradition proceedings: building trust by fighting abuse”.
18. The Assembly calls on member and observer States of the Council of Europe to intensify their efforts to hold the Russian Federation and Belarus to account at the United Nations, including by:
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24. The Assembly finally resolves to continue to exchange views with the Russian and Belarusian politicalanti-war movement and other opposition forces through its platforms for dialogue with the Russian andBelarusian democratic forces.
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Resolution 2542 (2024)1Provisional version
Sanctions against persons on the "Kara-Murza list"
Parliamentary Assembly
1. The Parliamentary Assembly pays tribute to Russian political prisoner Vladimir Kara-Murza, anopposition politician, journalist, documentary filmmaker, historian and writer.
2. In April 2023, Mr Kara-Murza was sentenced to 25 years in prison for criticising the Russian war ofaggression against Ukraine. He is subjected to particularly harsh prison conditions, which are putting his lifeand health at serious risk, particularly given the long-term effects of two earlier poisonings that came close tokilling him.
3. Vladimir Kara-Murza was handed down a particularly long prison sentence, compared to those metedout to other critics of the Russian war of aggression, most of whom have been sentenced to 5 to 10 years inprison. Mr Kara-Murza’s supporters consider the particularly harsh sentence as retaliation for his long-standing vocal support for “Magnitsky laws” on targeted sanctions against human rights violators.
4. “Magnitsky laws” such as those adopted by the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, numerouscentral and eastern European countries and not least by the European Union allow for imposing targetedsanctions against perpetrators of serious human rights violations who enjoy impunity in their own country,including police and State security officials. Vladimir Putin has made the elimination of “Magnitsky sanctions”against his supporters one of his foreign policy priorities.
5. The persons directly responsible for and participating in the persecution and ill-treatment of VladimirKara-Murza are well known. A detailed list can be found via this link “Kara-Murza list”. It includes prison staff,police officers, prosecutors and judges involved, in their respective roles, in the gross abuse of the Russianjustice system for the purpose of silencing Mr Kara-Murza.
6. These persons should be included in sanctions lists naming individuals, established under the existingand future Magnitsky-type sanctions laws.
7. The life of Vladimir Kara-Murza is threatened by the solitary confinement to which he is arbitrarilysubjected, despite his weakened state of health following two poisonings which he narrowly survived.
8. The tragic and sudden death in prison in February 2024 of Alexei Navalny, an outspoken Kremlin criticand anti-corruption activist, who had similarly been subject to and narrowly survived poisoning by a nerveagent, highlights the urgency of ensuring the release of Vladimir Kara-Murza from prison and of holding toaccount on a personal and individual basis all those involved in his persecution.
9. As a dual citizen of the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom, Mr Kara-Murza could be includedin any exchange of Russian spies held by Western States against political prisoners and other persons,including citizens of foreign States that are being held hostage by the Russian Federation.
10. The Assembly, therefore:
10.1. invites all States that have not yet adopted Magnitsky-type targeted sanctions laws to do sowithout further delay;
1. Assembly debate on 17 April 2024 (11th sitting) (see Doc. 15939, report of the Committee on Legal Affairs andHuman Rights, rapporteur: Mr Eerik-Niiles Kross). Text adopted by the Assembly on 17 April 2024 (11th sitting).
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10.2. calls on the European Union and all States having laws on targeted sanctions to include in their sanctions lists the persons directly responsible for the persecution and ill-treatment of Vladimir Kara-Murza and the persecution, ill-treatment and death of Alexei Navalny, and those participating in them;
10.3. urges all States negotiating exchanges of prisoners with the Russian Federation to include Vladimir Kara-Murza in any such exchange;
10.4. calls on the authorities of the Russian Federation to release Vladimir Kara-Murza without delay, while immediately rectifying his current conditions of detention until such release so as not to further jeopardise his health and his life
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Resolution 2543 (2024)1Provisional version
Freedom of expression and assembly of LGBTI people in Europe
Parliamentary Assembly
1. The rights to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly are fundamental human rights for all.Everyone must be able to enjoy these human rights equally and in safety, and the European Convention onHuman Rights (ETS No. 5) guarantees these rights. The Reykjavik Principles for Democracy, adopted in May2023 by the Heads of State and Government of the Council of Europe at the 4th Summit, reaffirm thecommitment of the member States to protecting freedom of expression and freedom of assembly.
2. Undeniable progress has been made in the advancement of rights and in preventing and tacklingviolence and discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) people over thepast two decades. More and more European cities are holding Pride marches. However, there have also beenattacks on the freedom of expression and freedom of assembly of LGBTI persons in many member States ofthe Council of Europe. LGBTI events have been cancelled, stopped from taking place or have not beenauthorised, contrary to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, which provides that concerns asto the maintaining of public order cannot justify banning peaceful public LGBTI events or imposingdisproportionate restrictions on them.
3. Bans on LGBTI events, crackdowns on events by law enforcement authorities, non-existent orinadequate protection against attacks on gatherings, harassment, intimidation, physical attacks, onlineattacks, threats, the adoption of “anti-LGBTI propaganda” laws and censorship are all attacks on the freedomof expression and freedom of assembly of LGBTI persons. Attacks or obstacles intended to deny LGBTIpersons these rights contribute to their stigmatisation and invisibilisation and make them more vulnerable tohuman rights violations. The visibility of LGBTI persons and movements must be protected, as it is anaffirmation of the identity and existence of LGBTI persons in the public space. The Parliamentary Assemblyexpresses its serious concern for LGBTI persons living in the Russian Federation where the so-called “LGBTIinternational movement” has been designated as extremist by the country's Supreme Court, resulting in thecriminalisation of a wide range of activities related to the exercise of freedom of association, assembly, andexpression. It is imperative to safeguard the rights of LGBTI persons amidst such oppressive measures.
4. Anti-LGBTI hate speech is often used for political ends, targeting not only part of the population, whichis potentially endangered as a result, but also human rights defenders, politicians, and others who recogniseand support the equal enjoyment of human rights by LGBTI persons. The Assembly asserts that there is nosuch thing as so-called “LGBTI ideology” and that the rights of LGBTI persons are the same as those of allother people. It roundly condemns all bias-motivated speech on grounds of sexual orientation, gender identityand sex characteristics. Such hate speech fuels other bias-motivated crimes against LGBTI persons. It pointsout that political leaders have a duty to prevent and combat hate speech, whatever the motivation behind it.The creation within the Assembly of the Parliamentary Platform for the rights of LGBTI persons in Europe in2022 demonstrates this commitment.
1. Assembly debate on 17 April 2024 (11th sitting) (see Doc. 15953, report of the Committee on Equality and Non-Discrimination, rapporteur: Mr Christophe Lacroix). Text adopted by the Assembly on 17 April 2024 (11th sitting).
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5. Fully guaranteeing freedom of expression and freedom of assembly is not just vital in any democraticsociety, but also a human rights obligation. The Assembly regrets that equality before the law, particularly forLGBTI persons, has not yet been fully achieved throughout Europe. It is especially concerned at the risingnumber of attacks on transgender people. It calls for transgender people’s rights to be respected and for theirprotection in all circumstances and strongly condemns hate speech and transphobic violence against them.
6. The Assembly reiterates its call to the member States in Resolution 2417 (2022) “Combating rising hateagainst LGBTI people in Europe” to tackle hatred and discrimination against LGBTI persons with renewedenergy and urgency. It also emphasises the importance of implementing Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)5 ofthe Committee of Ministers to member States on measures to combat discrimination on grounds of sexualorientation or gender identity.
7. In light of these considerations, the Assembly calls on the member and observer States of the Councilof Europe, and States whose parliaments enjoy observer or partner for democracy status with the Assemblyto:
7.1. ensure that judgments of the European Court of Human Rights relating to the rights of LGBTI persons are implemented;
7.2. refrain from adopting constitutional amendments contrary to the rights of LGBTI persons and to repeal any provision of this kind already in force;
7.3. ensure that laws against hate and discrimination are enforced, to amend them if they do not yet include provisions concerning discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression and sex characteristics, and to step up efforts to prevent and tackle intersectional discrimination;
7.4. repeal “anti-LGBTI propaganda” laws if they have been enacted and implemented, and to allow all persons to access information about different types of sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression and sex characteristics;
7.5. work towards annulling all declarations and charters contrary to LGBTI rights adopted at local and regional levels, where applicable;
7.6. support the visibility of LGBTI persons in the public space;
7.7. support the holding of Pride marches and other demonstrations supporting LGBTI persons’ effective enjoyment of human rights, to protect them if necessary, to take adequate measures to facilitate access to gatherings and contain counter-demonstrators, and publicly condemn all illegal interference with the exercise of freedom of expression and peaceful assembly by LGBTI persons or human rights organisations that support LGBTI rights;
7.8. investigate, prosecute and where appropriate punish perpetrators of bias-motivated violence against LGBTI persons;
7.9. effectively combat strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs);
7.10. implement Recommendation CM/Rec(2022)16 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on combating hate speech and General Policy Recommendation No. 17 of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) on preventing and combating intolerance and discrimination against LGBTI persons;
7.11. establish the consultation of LGBTI organisations in legislative processes, especially in areas that may impact the human rights of LGBTI persons.
8. With regard to preventing violence, prejudice and discrimination against LGBTI persons, the Assemblycalls on the member and observer States of the Council of Europe, and States whose parliaments enjoyobserver or partner for democracy status with the Assembly to:
8.1. outlaw conversion practices, if they have not already done so, and to utilise existing domestic violence legislation to prosecute the perpetrators of conversion practices, where possible;
8.2. invest in gender equality education and to train teachers on these issues;
8.3. support programmes of sex and emotional education inclusive of LGBTI identities which are tailored to the ages of pupils in schools;
8.4. train law enforcement officers to protect specific groups, including LGBTI persons, during demonstrations and public events;
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8.5. run awareness campaigns on LGBTI rights and diversity;
8.6. guarantee legal recognition of gender identity;
8.7. recognise, if this is not already the case, the right to marriage for same-sex couples.
9. The Assembly welcomes the creation of the Council of Europe’s Committee of Experts on SexualOrientation, Gender Identity and Expression and Sex Characteristics (ADI-SOGIESC) and calls on themember States to appoint a member to it and to support its work.
10. The Assembly urges member States to recognise fears of persecution on grounds of sexual orientation,gender identity, gender expression or sex characteristics as grounds for granting asylum, to be supportive ofasylum applications made by LGBTI persons who have been forced to flee their country for these reasons andto ensure their access to humanitarian and entry visas to grant access to their territories.
11. The Assembly also asks political parties to commit to tackling hate, whatever the basis for it, to opposeanti-LGBTI hate speech and disinformation, and to adhere to the principles and rules of the Charter ofEuropean political parties for a non-racist and inclusive society. It expresses support for LGBTI rightsdefenders and civil society organisations working to protect the rights of LGBTI persons.
12. Lastly, the Assembly calls on the member States to give political and financial backing to the mandateof the United Nations Independent Expert on protection against violence and discrimination based on sexualorientation and gender identity, and to support the implementation of his recommendations.
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Resolution 2544 (2024)1Provisional version
The honouring of obligations and commitments by Albania
Parliamentary Assembly
1. Albania joined the Council of Europe on 13 July 1995. Upon its accession, it undertook to honour theobligations incumbent on all member States under Article 3 of the Statute of the Council of Europe (ETS No.1) with regard to pluralist democracy, the rule of law and human rights. In addition, it undertook to honour anumber of specific commitments listed in Opinion 189 (1995) “Application by Albania for membership of theCouncil of Europe”, adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly on 29 June 1995. In conformity with themonitoring procedure, as established in Resolution 1115 (1997), the Assembly has regularly assessedAlbania’s progress with regard to the honouring of its obligations and commitments.
2. The previous report on the honouring of obligations and commitments by Albania was debated by theAssembly on 2 October 2014 and led to the adoption of Resolution 2019 (2014). The Assembly welcomes thatmany of the recommendations and concerns outlined in Resolution 2019 (2014) were addressed, and thatAlbania has made considerable and tangible progress in honouring its membership obligations and accessioncommitments to the Council of Europe. At the same time, the Assembly is cognisant that a number ofunresolved issues and concerns remain that the country should strive to address.
3. The Assembly welcomes that the protracted systemic political crisis that has plagued the country foryears has recently started to subside, although its root causes have not yet been resolved. Nevertheless, theAssembly remains concerned about the polarised political environment which is the Achilles heel of thedemocratic consolidation of the country. Constant vigilance in this respect is necessary and all political forcesshould continue to work incessantly to create a political environment that is truly conducive to democraticinteraction and governance.
4. The Assembly welcomes the adoption, in 2020, of a new legal framework for elections that was basedon an inclusive process and broad consensus between the political stakeholders. However, it is concernedabout the frequent changes to the electoral framework which reflect a tendency to play with the rules insteadof by the rules. The Assembly reiterates that stability of electoral legislation is essential to ensure the trust ofthe stakeholders and wider public in the electoral process and the outcome of the elections. Therefore, whilecalling on all political stakeholders to address, well before next elections take place, the shortcomings anddeficiencies identified during past elections, the Assembly urges them to move away from using constantchanges to the Electoral Code as a mechanism to alter the balance of power or alternative to normal politicalinteraction in the framework of the parliament. With regard to the electoral framework, the Assembly callsupon the Albanian authorities and Parliament, based on a broad consensus between all political forces, to:
4.1. adopt, and consistently implement, legislation to address the abuse of administrative resources and vote buying that have marred previous elections in the country;
4.2. adopt the necessary legislation to ensure that the legal framework for party and campaign financing is fully in line with international standards;
4.3. agree on the demarcation of the new electoral districts, as foreseen by the 2020 Electoral Code, based on an inclusive process that fully adheres to international standards;
1. Assembly debate on 17 April 2024 (11th sitting) (see Doc. 15950, report of the Committee on the Honouring ofObligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee), co-rapporteur:Mr Ionuț-Marian Stroe). Text adopted by the Assembly on 17 April 2024 (11th sitting).
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4.4. adopt, as a matter of priority and well before new elections take place, the required legislation to allow out-of-country voting for the sizable Albanian diaspora, in line with the judgment of the Constitutional Court of Albania.
5. The Assembly is concerned that the political polarisation in the country, compounded by inter and intraparty antics, is undermining the system of checks and balances and limiting parliamentary oversight. In thiscontext, it regrets that the parliament has not been able to find the required two-third majority to appoint a newOmbudsperson and a new Commissioner for the Protection from Discrimination, whose terms of offices haveended, and has resorted to using anti-blocking mechanisms lowering the required majority for otherappointments, including for the election of the President of the Republic. The Assembly calls upon theopposition and ruling majority to ensure the proper functioning of the system of checks and balances,including an efficient and effective parliamentary oversight over the executive, and to respect each other’srightful role and place in the governance of the country. In addition, the Assembly urges the ruling majority andopposition to appoint, on the basis of a broad consensus, a new Ombudsperson and Commissioner for theProtection from Discrimination, which is essential for the democratic legitimacy of these important institutions.
6. The Assembly welcomes the successful completion of the territorial and administrative reform whichhas considerably reduced the number of municipalities and has strengthened the efficacity of local self-government and the provision of services to their citizens. It notes that adjustments to the territorialadministrative map, both to strengthen the efficiency of local self-government and to address some ofundesired effects of the reform, are being considered by the different political forces in Albania. It is importantthat any changes to the number of municipalities or the municipal borderlines should be based on a broadconsensus between the different stakeholders, while respecting the logic of the reform to create strong andeffective local government providing services that are close to the citizens.
7. In this context, the Assembly is concerned that the territorial and administrative reform has had a directimpact on the enjoyment of minority rights in Albania. A number of municipalities where minorities formed thelocal majority have been merged into larger municipalities where these minorities no longer form a majority, oreven a sizable segment, of the population. This is compounded by the fact that key minority rights, such asthe right to education in minority languages and the right to use minority languages in local governmentaffairs, are only granted at the local level when the minority population in question exceeds 20% of thepopulation in the municipality. This threshold is excessive and is only met in a very limited number ofmunicipalities with sizable minority populations. This should be remedied, in close consultation with theminorities concerned, including in the context of the consideration of possible adjustments to theadministrative territorial map.
8. The Assembly takes note of the findings in the report on Albania of the Congress of Local and RegionalAuthorities of the Council of Europe, adopted on 22 September 2021, including with regard to the allocation offunctions and responsibilities between central and local governments as well as the financial autonomy ofmunicipalities. It calls upon the Albanian authorities to fully address the concerns and recommendationscontained in this report.
9. The reform of the judiciary, with a view to assuring its genuine independence and the efficientadministration of justice, has been a long-standing priority for the Assembly within the monitoring procedurefor Albania. The Assembly therefore welcomes the considerable and tangible progress that has been made inthis regard by the Albanian authorities. The Assembly in particular welcomes the constitutional amendmentsof 2016 that allowed, in line with recommendations of the European Commission for Democracy through Law(Venice Commission), for the complete reorganisation of the High and Constitutional Courts and theestablishment of a High Council of Justice and a High Prosecutorial Council, as well as specialised judicialinstitutions to fight the endemic corruption in the country.
10. The constitutional amendments also allowed for the vetting, under international supervision, of alljudges and prosecutors in Albania. While being aware of the considerable, albeit temporary, impact of thisvetting procedure on the functioning of key judicial institutions in Albania, the Assembly considers the vettingprocedure to be a success. The very high number of judges and prosecutors that did not pass the vettingprocedure, more than 60% of all positions vetted, underscores both the importance and the necessity of thisvetting process.
11. The Assembly welcomes the establishment of a new judicial map, in close consultation with the Councilof Europe and European Union, with a view to increasing the quality and efficiency of the justice system andto address the considerable backlog of cases that are before the courts. The judicial map will be evaluated
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every five years on the basis of recommendations by the High Council of Justice, which should allay and address any possible concerns with regard to the access of citizens to the justice system as a result of this reform.
12. While welcoming the marked and tangible progress made, the Assembly urges the authorities to makeall necessary efforts to fully eradicate internal and external interference in the judiciary and to address the stilltoo low clearance rate of cases before the courts.
13. Marked progress has been made with regard to the fight against the still widespread and systemiccorruption in Albania, and the persistent concerns of intertwinement of organised crime with economic andpolitical interests in the country. A Specialised Structure for Anti-Corruption and Organised Crime (SPAK,comprising of the Special Prosecution Office (SPO), the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and twoSpecialised Anti-Corruption and Organised Crime Courts) is now fully operational and starts to produceconcrete results, including with regard to cases of high-level corruption. It is important that these tangibleresults become a non-reversable trend, and that the anti-corruption structures have all the resources theyneed, to send a clear signal at all levels of society that there is no impunity for corrupt behaviour.
14. Emphasising that SPAK was established to investigate and adjudicate high-level cases of corruptionand organised crime, the Assembly considers that the monetary threshold for cases to fall in an obligatorymanner within SPAKs mandate – currently around € 500 – is too low and risks inundating SPAK with casesand therefore limit its capacity to fight high-level corruption. It strongly recommends to the authorities to raisethis monetary threshold.
15. The Assembly takes note of the compliance report by the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO)for Albania in the framework of its fifth evaluation round on preventing corruption and promoting integrity incentral governments (top executive functions) and law enforcement agencies. While welcoming the progressnoted by GRECO, it regrets that only 5 of the 24 recommendations made in GRECO’s evaluation report havebeen satisfactorily addressed, while 13 recommendations have only been implemented partially and 6 not atall. The Assembly urges the authorities to fully implement the recommendations made by GRECO as a matterof priority and in particular to:
15.1. address GRECO’s misgivings about the Ethics Committee set up to oversee the implementation of, and adherence to, the Ministerial Code of Ethics, by removing members of the government from this committee;
15.2. ensure in law and practice that the Prime Minister is accountable to the Ministerial Code of Ethics;
15.3. ensure that all ministries appoint the integrity coordinators tasked with ensuring compliance with the integrity plans developed by each ministry in consultation with the different stakeholders including civil society;
15.4. ensure that regulations adopted to safeguard the transparency of the interactions of the ministers and persons with top executive functions with lobbyists cover all forms of contact, including by electronic means, and not only physical meetings.
16. With regard to the execution of judgments by the European Court of Human Rights (the “Court”), theAssembly welcomes the decision by the Committee of Ministers to close its supervision of the execution of theset of cases in Manushaqe Puto and others v. Albania, indicating a successful resolution of the casesregarding the restitution of properties expropriated by the communist regime that ruled Albania from 1944 to1992, which had been an important concern of the Assembly. Nevertheless, the number of cases againstAlbania before the European Court of Human Rights and under supervision by the Committee of Ministers isstill too high and additional and consistent efforts are needed to ensure prompt execution of the judgments ofthe Court, especially with regard to the execution of domestic court judgments and the excessive length ofproceedings. The Assembly highlights the importance of respecting the protection of property and calls uponthe Albanian authorities to ensure the enforcement of final judicial decisions issued by domestic courts on thismatter thus avoiding the need for new cases to be brought before the Court.
17. The Assembly deeply regrets that, despite the overall progress in honouring its obligations andcommitments, the media environment has continued to deteriorate in Albania. This backsliding is of seriousconcern as a free and pluralist media environment is an essential requirement for a well-functioningdemocracy. The Assembly therefore calls upon the Albanian authorities to:
17.1. refrain from using threats and harsh rhetoric against journalists that affects their physical safety and their capacity to report;
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17.2. fully decriminalise defamation, in line with international standards, and cap the disproportionately high fines and excessive amounts of compensation which may be awarded for defamation, which have a chilling effect on journalists and incite self-censorship;
17.3. enact proper legislation to counter the use of strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) against journalists, media outlets and civil society organisations.
18. The Assembly pays tribute to the diverse multicultural Albanian society and its historic tradition ofinterreligious dialogue and tolerance. While recognising that national minorities are – with some exceptions –well integrated in the Albanian society, the Assembly has some concerns with regard to the adequacy of thelegal framework for the protection of minority rights. While the adoption of the 2017 Law on the Protection ofNational Minorities was a major and welcome step forward, the Assembly notes that three essential by-lawsthat are required to implement the provisions of this law, have still not been adopted. The by-laws that are stilllacking concern key aspects for the enjoyment of minority rights including the right to self-identification, theright to education in minority languages and their use in communication with authorities, and the procedure forthe recognition of national minorities. In relation to the protection of national minority rights the Assemblyurges the authorities to:
18.1. adopt without further delay, and in close consultation with the Council of Europe Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, the three by-laws to the 2017 Law on the Protection of Minorities governing the right to self-identification, the right to education in minority languages and their use in communication with authorities, and the procedure for the recognition of national minorities;
18.2. lower considerably, and flexibly interpret, the requirement that a national minority needs to amount to more than 20% of the local population before minority rights and services are legally guaranteed at the municipality level.
19. With regard to the situation of LGBTI+ rights, the Assembly welcomes the adoption of the amendmentsto the Labour Code that prohibit discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation or gender. At the sametime, it notes that Albania still does not allow for the registration of same sex partnerships, contrary toEuropean standards, or allow people to change their name and gender in the civil registry, which preventsthese persons from exercising their civil rights. It calls upon the authorities to address these two issues as amatter of priority.
20. The Assembly regrets that Albania has not joined the European Charter for Regional or MinorityLanguages (ETS No. 148). Given the extended presence of minority languages in Albania, it calls upon theauthorities to sign and ratify it as a matter of priority.
21. The Assembly welcomes the clearly expressed political will by the Albanian authorities, as well as allpolitical forces in the country, to address, as a matter of priority and in close co-operation with the Assemblyand the relevant Council of Europe bodies, the concerns and recommendations made in this resolution andthe accompanying report of the Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by MemberStates of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee). The Assembly therefore resolves to close themonitoring procedure in respect of Albania and engage in a post-monitoring dialogue with Albania in line withResolution 2018 (2014) with the objective of addressing the remaining concerns outlined in this resolution.
22. At the same time, should no tangible and concrete progress have been made in addressing theAssembly’s concerns and recommendations with regard to the fight against corruption, the protection ofminorities, and media freedom and freedom of expression, as expressed in paragraphs 15, 17 and 18 of thisresolution, the Assembly expects its Monitoring Committee to consider, already in its first report under thepost-monitoring dialogue, whether Albania should be returned to the full monitoring procedure.
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Resolution 2545 (2024)1Provisional version
Mainstreaming the human right to a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment with the Reykjavik process
Parliamentary Assembly
1. The Parliamentary Assembly stresses that the challenge of climate change constitutes the greatestexistential emergency for humankind and that this emergency is mainly due to the lack of long-lastingstructural action.
2. The Assembly notes with dismay that the Council of Europe is now the only regional human rightssystem which has not yet formally recognised the right to a healthy environment.
3. For decades, however, the Assembly has been urging the Council of Europe member States to takethis step. In particular, it reaffirms its Recommendation 2211 (2021) “Anchoring the right to a healthyenvironment: need for enhanced action by the Council of Europe”.
4. The Assembly notes that at the 4th Council of Europe Summit, held in Reykjavik on 16 and 17 May2023, the Heads of State and Government recognised the urgency of additional efforts to protect theenvironment, as well as to counter the impact of the “triple planetary crisis of pollution, climate change andloss of biodiversity” and its effects on human rights, democracy and the rule of law. An Intersecretariat TaskForce on the Environment was established in January 2024 and has carried out a stocktaking survey ofexisting activities, planned activities and proposals for new activities. It also proposed elements for thedevelopment of a first Council of Europe strategy on the environment.
5. The Assembly also notes that in 2024, the Committee of Ministers will have to follow up work on thefeasibility of instruments on human rights and the environment and the draft convention superseding andreplacing the Convention on the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law (ETS No. 172).
6. Mindful of the strategic importance of this moment, almost one year on from the 4th Summit and threeyears after Recommendation 2211 (2021), the Assembly wishes to update its expectations and contribute tothe implementation of the Reykjavik process through concrete and realistic proposals.
7. The post-Reykjavik environment Strategy will be implemented by and for the young generations andmust be supported by civil society. The course must therefore be firmly fixed for the future and the bar set highas the Council of Europe and its member States will be held accountable for decades to come. The Assemblyconsiders that the requirements in terms of accountability must be extremely strict: transparency, ethics,accessibility, responsibility, efficiency, and reliability must be the watchwords of all the measures deployed.
8. The Assembly underlines the need for the future strategy to have a clear goal in terms of settingstandards at European level and encourages decision makers to focus on drawing up a legal bindinginstrument recognising an autonomous right to a healthy environment within the Council of Europe.
1. Assembly debate on 18 April 2024 (12th sitting) (see Doc. 15955, report of Committee on Social Affairs, Health andSustainable Development, rapporteur: Mr Simon Moutquin). Text adopted by the Assembly on 18 April 2024 (12th sitting).
See also Recommendation 2272 (2024).
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9. The Assembly reiterates that the nature, content and implications of the right to a healthy environmenthave been widely documented for decades and have been the subject of a wealth of scientific, normative andjudicial material.
10. The Assembly welcomes the fact that almost all Council of Europe member States recognise the rightto a healthy environment in one form or another in their national legislation and that some systems havealready adopted an eco-centric view of this right.
11. In terms of governance, ecological transition will not take place without the buy-in of citizens because ofits far-reaching impact on lifestyles. In the Assembly’s view, this means that the future strategy must introduceconcrete and ambitious measures to promote social acceptance of environmental policies, ensuringmeaningful and fully-fledged citizen participation at national level.
12. In addition to compliance with environmental standards and policies, the Assembly encouragesmeasures aimed at strengthening the resilience of the most vulnerable populations and ensuring theirinclusion without discrimination in the transition to a sustainable future.
13. The Assembly believes that greater responsiveness can be achieved through the development ofspecialised environmental teams in all branches of governance. This approach should also be encouraged inthe allocation of budgets to courts. For national parliaments to be involved in such developments andenvironmental policies in general entails that they too should have specialised bodies.
14. In the light of these considerations, the Assembly calls on the Council of Europe member States to:
14.1. continue to reflect continuously at national level on the nature, content and implications of theright to a healthy environment so that, in the near future, this right will be recognised in law as anautonomous human right in each member State;
14.2. step up their efforts to promote, in all governance bodies, the legitimacy and added value of theCouncil of Europe playing a leading role in drawing up a binding legal instrument recognising anautonomous right to a healthy environment;
14.3. engage in innovative projects to transform environmental governance and in particular to:
14.3.1. encourage the introduction of effective citizen participation mechanisms at national level, such as citizens’ assemblies on climate, to promote social acceptance of environmental policies;
14.3.2. provide a framework, structure and support for local initiatives targeting the populations most vulnerable to environmental problems, such as programmes designed to mobilise young people from working-class backgrounds;
14.3.3. support the creation of specialised environmental teams in all branches of governance.
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Resolution 2546 (2024)1Provisional version
Towards Council of Europe strategies for healthy seas and oceans to counter the climate crisis
Parliamentary Assembly
1. Our planet’s seas and oceans are complex ecosystems that are vital for sustaining biodiversity and thelivelihood of humans, as well as for regulating the global climate. According to the United Nations, oceans andseas provide 50% of the oxygen needed for life, absorb a quarter of all carbon dioxide emissions and capture90% of the excess heat generated by those emissions. They are not only the lungs of the planet but also itslargest carbon sink and play a crucial role in tackling climate change. Representing 71% of the world’ssurface, they are essential to life and the economy, in particular transport. However, just like terrestriallandscapes, seas and oceans suffer from the triple crisis of pollution, loss of biodiversity and climate change.
2. Healthy seas and oceans can be our allies in mitigating the triple crisis and the associated threats ofsocial, economic and political nature. As seas and oceans are at the crossroads of human and environmentalvulnerabilities, preserving their health is in the direct interest of humankind. In this context, the ParliamentaryAssembly underscores the responsibility of member States of the Council of Europe in the realisation of theUnited Nations (UN) Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and, in particular, SDG 14: conserve andsustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development. The Council of Europeshould contribute to bringing the human dimension of maritime activities to the fore and ensure that Europeanstandards apply more broadly in order to raise the level of protection of human rights.
3. Following the Reykjavik Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Council of Europe (on 16and 17 May 2023), political recognition of the right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment paves theway to better protection and the full exercise of the human rights of current and future generations. TheAssembly therefore highlights the duty and challenge of fully acknowledging the need to work on climateresilience, to repair harm and to preserve the maritime heritage for future generations as part of the Reykjavikprocess. Addressing the condition of seas and oceans from a human rights perspective implies a moreadequate consideration of major problem areas linked to the fishing industry, exploitation of the mineralresources in the seabed (in particular deep-sea mining), protection of coastal populations, plastic waste andchemical pollution, proliferation of ships flying “flags of convenience” and unsafe reuse or dismantling of ships.
4. The Assembly recalls its Recommendation 1888 (2009) “Towards a new ocean governance” whichcalled for novel approaches to managing oceans and seas. It welcomes the historic agreement which led tothe adoption of the Biodiversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction Treaty (also known as BBNJ or HighSeas Treaty) concluded on 4 March 2023 under the auspices of the United Nations. This agreement coversinternational waters whose protection was previously fragmented and not included in the understanding of theterritorial or internal waters of a State in line with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea(UNCLOS, “Montego Bay Convention”). The new treaty fundamentally changes the governance arrangementsboth inside and outside territorial waters. The high seas are now regarded as a “global public good” whichcovers a little over half of the surface of the globe, or 64% of the oceans.
1. Assembly debate on 18 April 2024 (12th sitting) (see Doc. 15956, report of Committee on Social Affairs, Health andSustainable Development, rapporteur: Ms Yuliia Ovchynnykova). Text adopted by the Assembly on 18 April 2024(12th sitting).
See also Recommendation 2273 (2024).
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5. The Assembly notes that the preservation of biodiversity of seas and oceans is one of the objectives ofthe Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats (ETS No. 104, “BernConvention”) and considers that this convention provides a good basis to contribute to better protection ofseas and oceans around Europe. The activities of the Standing Committee of the Bern Convention should befurther strengthened to protect marine ecosystems effectively and safeguard the rights of future generations.
6. The Assembly, therefore, calls on the Council of Europe member and non-member States to:
6.1. support the implementation of major international treaties governing the protection of marine life:
6.1.1. the UNCLOS which is the main component of the legal framework applying to the seas and oceans;
6.1.2. the Agreement on Port State Measures to combat illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing;
6.1.3. the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, of 1972 (“London Dumping Convention”);
6.1.4. the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships of 1973 to prevent pollution of the marine environment by ships from operational or accidental causes;
6.1.5. the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework and the European Union Habitats directive on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora, of 1992, which protect the seabed and marine species amongst other;
6.2. sign and ratify the UN High Seas Treaty so that it can reach 60 ratifications and enter into force in 2025;
6.3. support the Bern Convention and stabilise the resources allocated to its implementation;
6.4. consolidate the link between human rights and the environment, including the seas and oceans dimension, through the Reykjavik Process, and work towards agreeing a comprehensive Council of Europe strategy in this field;
6.5. incorporate the seas and oceans dimension in their national mitigation, adaptation and resilience policies to tackle the climate crisis and ensure adequate involvement of the population whose livelihood directly depends on the health of seas and oceans, notably with regard to fishing activities and exploitation of coastlines;
6.6. ensure the rights enshrined in the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention) and provide intelligible information to the public;
6.7. raise public awareness on the issues of overfishing and illegal fishing and expand public participation in decision making aimed at addressing these problems;
6.8. ensure a broad, democratic and transparent mandate of the UN international legally binding instrument to put an end to plastic pollution, including in the marine environment, in order to address the entire life cycle of plastic waste and not only their release into oceans and seas, to be completed by the end of 2024,;
6.9. provide for effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties for those responsible for any marine pollution, including the possibility of prison sentences in case of deliberate pollution;
6.10. strengthen their legal arsenal and capacity to introduce a new offence that would make it possible to criminally prosecute those who harm the health of seas and oceans;
6.11. contribute to the work of the International Maritime Organisation with a view to bringing the human dimension of maritime activities to the fore, promoting the application of key European human rights standards so that each sector of global maritime activity would meet a high level of protection of human rights;
6.12. promote the codification of the term “ecocide” at national, regional, European and international levels;
6.13. ask national parliaments to provide awareness raising for their parliamentarians on the issue of the right to a healthy environment in general and in relation to marine environment and maritime law;
6.14. support Black sea mine clearance initiatives and activities.
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7. The Assembly invites member States to consider “An Environmental Compact for Ukraine – A GreenFuture: Recommendations for Accountability and Recovery” proposed by the High-level Working Group on theEnvironmental Consequences of the War concerning the environmental damage affecting the Black Sea. TheAssembly encourages Ukraine to co-ordinate activities with allied States that abut the Black Sea in order to:
7.1. collect and analyse information on mines and unexploded ordnance in the Black Sea, water pollution levels and other effects of war on animal and sea life and on biodiversity;
7.2. establish a standing body to report regularly on the environmental impact of the war and transmit this information to the Black Sea Commission and to other relevant international institutions together with recommendations to address this damage and prevent further harm.
8. With regard to good governance of marine resources, the Assembly invites member States to createnetworks of marine protected areas (MPAs) across Europe’s seas, in order to:
8.1. better identify the elements of biodiversity in MPAs and build a comprehensive inventory of marine resources with a view to optimising their conservation;
8.2. improve understanding of how marine systems are interconnected for ensuring better designation and planning of MPAs at regional level;
8.3. improve reporting mechanisms, data flows and knowledge sharing across Europe regarding marine areas with protected species and habitats, as well as the experience in management regimes designed to protect marine life and observations of how marine life reacts to pressures;
8.4. measure and assess the extent to which MPAs and their networks are achieving their intended purpose.
9. Lastly, the Assembly invites European Union member States to protect and restore 30% of theEuropean Union’s marine areas by 2030 by expanding MPAs with the goal of stopping trawling in those areasand calls on the non-European Union countries to draw on those measures to improve their domesticlegislation.
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Resolution 2547 (2024)1Provisional version
The protection of children against online violence
Parliamentary Assembly
1. The Parliamentary Assembly stresses the urgent need to protect children from violence in the digitalenvironment, especially in view of growing dangers on the internet and new forms of online violence.
2. Children are increasingly exposed to various forms of online violence, sometimes from an early age.The physical and psychological repercussions are often devastating. Increased use of the internet and digitaltools, particularly during the Covid-19 pandemic and lockdowns, has led to children being overexposed toage-inappropriate content and behaviour. Smartphones have undoubtedly opened up a new avenue forpersonal development online, but they are also a potential source of violence.
3. Creating a safe environment and minimising the risk of harm are essential to protect children online.Mindful of the difficulty of reconciling the protection of children and their freedom of expression and othercompeting rights, the Assembly reiterates that the best interests of the child must prevail in the developmentand implementation of any measure or policy.
4. The Assembly therefore calls on member States to establish a comprehensive legal framework thatprotects children in the digital environment by applying an integrated and balanced approach to reduceexposure to harm online while not infringing on children’s opportunities to benefit from the internet. Inparticular, it asks the member States to take the following steps to protect children:
4.1. as a minimum standard, impose effective age verification obligations on websites, particularly on sites providing goods and content which are not intended for children, and which would incur similar obligations in the offline world;
4.2. involve and raise awareness of parents and caregivers, who often lack the knowledge and support to detect online exploitation, abuse, violence and exposure of children to pornography, and empower them to deal with it with the backing of civil society and families' organisations;
4.3. take specific measures to protect young children from premature exposure to the digital environment given their vulnerability to, inter alia, violent, sexual or pornographic content and the limited benefits of digital tools with respect to their particular physical, physiological, social and stimulation needs;
4.4. in order to prevent child sexual abuse material and punish perpetrators, set up hash databases supplemented with the due cybersecurity measures with a view to expediting actions to identify and locate children subjected to sexual exploitation or abuse; remove or restrict access to such content; apprehend perpetrators; and provide child victims with the necessary psychological support and rehabilitative care;
4.5. implement school-based educational programmes and outdoor activities, in particular to promote peer-to-peer interactions and parental involvement;
1. Assembly debate on 19 April 2024 (14th sitting) (see Doc. 15954, report of Committee on Social Affairs, Health andSustainable Development, rapporteur: Mr Joseph O'Reilly). Text adopted by the Assembly on 19 April 2024 (14th sitting).
See also Recommendation 2274 (2024).
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4.6. in such programmes, provide children and young people with training on assertiveness, empathy, problem solving, emotion management and help seeking;
4.7. implement comprehensive sexuality education that covers the issues of online dating and relationships in depth and aims to counter portrayals of violence in sexual relationships and homophobic bullying and raise awareness about the fight against the oversexualisation of children;
4.8. run information and awareness-raising campaigns on harmful deepfakes, including those of a pornographic nature; ban deepfakes and ensure their removal from digital platforms.
5. The Assembly recommends that member States work closely with stakeholders in the technologyindustry in order to:
5.1. improve the development of policies and regulatory frameworks and facilitate their appropriation and implementation by the technology industry;
5.2. increase the accountability and responsibility of stakeholders in the technology industry to protect child users, including by requiring them to provide assistance to law enforcement authorities in terms of technical support and equipment to facilitate the identification of perpetrators of crimes against children and the collection of evidence required for criminal proceedings;
5.3. develop and implement policies that address cyberbullying, harassment and incitement to hatred and violence in the digital environment, including clear information on unacceptable behaviour, reporting mechanisms and the importance of support for children affected by such conduct;
5.4. integrate safety and privacy in the design and by default, while taking into account children’s right to protection from violence online, as guiding principles for the features and functionalities of products and services intended for or used by children.
6. In line of the latest edition of the European Day on the Protection of Children against SexualExploitation and Sexual Abuse on 18 November 2023, the Assembly is convinced of the importance oflearning from victims and survivors of childhood sexual violence in order to develop effective policies based onreal-life experiences. It recommends that member States listen to victims of childhood online violence, takingall necessary precautions, when drawing up measures and policies to prevent, protect against and combatonline violence.
7. The Assembly notes the importance of international and cross-border co-operation in protectingchildren from online violence and calls for as many countries as possible around the world to accede to therelevant treaties and effective mechanisms that already exist. In this respect, it calls for:
7.1. observer States and St ates whose parliaments enjoy observer or partner for democracy status with the Assembly to accede to the Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse (CETS No. 201, Lanzarote Convention);
7.2. member and observer States of the Council of Europe, and States whose parliaments enjoy observer or partner for democracy status with the Assembly that have not yet done so to accede to the Convention on Cybercrime (ETS No. 185, Budapest Convention);
7.3. Council of Europe member States that have not yet done so to join Interpol and its International Child Sexual Exploitation Database to exchange information on child sexual abuse cases.
8. The Assembly commends the Committee of the Parties to the Convention on the Protection of Childrenagainst Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse (Lanzarote Committee) for its work on the second monitoringround (2017-2022) on the implementation of the Lanzarote Convention, focusing on the protection of childrenagainst sexual exploitation and sexual abuse facilitated by information and communication technologies(ICTs) and addressing the challenges raised by child self-generated sexual images and/or videos. It invitesthe States Parties to the Lanzarote Convention to pursue their work on children and emerging technologies, inparticular artificial intelligence and the virtual world, in greater depth, taking into consideration new risks forchildren, including those linked to deepfakes of a sexual or pornographic nature.
9. The Assembly is determined to further examine the issue of “violent pornography”, includingpornography available online, taking into account the specific problem of children being exposed to suchcontent.
A DIVISÃO DE REDAÇÃO.
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