3.1. The relevant constitutional changes were adopted in an ad hoc accelerated procedure not foreseen in the Russian Constitution. The regular constitutional amendment procedure requires the convocation of a Constitutional Assembly and that there shall be specific amending laws on the different changes proposed, rather than a single en bloc vote on all amendments. Instead, a novel ad hoc sui generis procedure was introduced by the Amending Law. Under this procedure, the President requested the Constitutional Court’s opinion on the compatibility with the Constitution of the Amending Law, delivered within seven days. Then a single ad hoc “nationwide vote” was held that was not subject to the strict safeguards applicable to referendums.

3.2. The Assembly therefore fully agrees with the conclusion of the Venice Commission that the novel, ad hoc procedure used to amend the Constitution creates an obvious tension with Article 16 of the Constitution which safeguards the “firm fundamentals of the constitutional system of the Russian Federation”.

3.3. The Assembly also fully shares the Venice Commission’s view that “[a] decision to alter or remove presidential term limits should be subject to thorough public scrutiny, as it has a significant impact on the political system, a country’s stability and on confidence in the electoral process. In the long term, a reform of these provisions may affect democratic quality or even democratic endurance. A broad consensus, as well as respect for constitutional and legal procedures, are crucial to maintain strong democracy and confidence in institutions and electoral processes.”

3.4. It also agrees with the Venice Commission in that “[t]o the extent that constitutional amendments strengthening or prolonging the power of high offices of state are proposed... such amendments (if enacted) should have effect only for future holders of the office, not for the incumbent.”

3.5. The Assembly therefore considers in view of the hasty procedure followed for the adoption of the amendments in question, the en bloc vote on very disparate issues, including protection of social rights, and the fact that the incumbent himself benefits from these changes, that the international standards summed up by the Venice Commission were clearly not met. The abolition of presidential term limits for the benefit of MM. Putin and Medvedev thus violates not only the Russian constitution, but also well-established international legal principles.

4. The overwhelming power of the President resulting from the extremely long term in office combinedwith the lack of any checks and balances such as a strong parliament, an independent judiciary, free mediaand a vibrant civil society has turned the Russian Federation into a de facto dictatorship.

5. These tendencies, with limited response from the international community, set a concerning precedentfor countries lacking a robust democratic tradition, as seen in the case of Belarus, where the self-proclaimedpresident de facto maintains power despite the results of the 2020 elections not being recognised.

6. As the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and its political and economic consequences show,dictatorships constitute a threat to international peace and security and to the territorial integrity and politicalindependence of their neighbours, within the meaning of Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations. TheRussian Federation employs acts of aggression against sovereign nations as a strategy to enhance thePresident’s domestic image, with the Chechen wars of the late 1990s, the Russian Federation’s influence inthe Transnistria region of Moldova, and its aggression against Georgia in 2008 serving as illustrativeexamples. Dictatorships also destroy the fundamental rights and the social and economic well-being of theirown population. It is therefore in the interest first and foremost of the people of the Russian Federation, butalso of Europe and the whole world that democracy be restored in the Russian Federation.

7. The Assembly recalls that all States parties to the Statute of the International Criminal Court are legallybound to arrest Vladimir Putin when he enters their jurisdiction on the basis of the arrest warrant issued by theInternational Criminal Court on 17 March 2023.

8. The Assembly calls on the member States of the Council of Europe to recognise Vladimir Putin asillegitimate after the end of his current presidential term and to cease all contact with him, except forhumanitarian contact and in the pursuit of peace.

3. The Assembly recalls that the European Commission for Democracy through Law (VeniceCommission) in its Interim Opinion of 23 March 2021 found that the ad hominem term-limit waiver for theincumbent President of the Russian Federation violates both Russian constitutional law and international legalprinciples.

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