8. Opposition rights are considered as an institutionalised power possessed by the opposition inparliament that encompasses and goes beyond rights of individual legislators to speak and vote againstgovernment bills. Enshrining and clearly defining rights and guarantees in law is an effective tool for thefunctioning of the parliamentary opposition. Institutional procedures, recognition, legitimisation andinstitutionalisation of the parliamentary opposition are integral to the idea of constitutional democracy itself andintegral part of the political culture.

9. The legitimisation of the parliamentary opposition in the constitution, laws as well as rules of procedure,provides, on the one hand, legal guarantees within government-opposition relations to limit the politicalinfluence of the parliamentary majority on the minority. On the other hand, by placing the opposition on anequal footing with the majority, it requires them to be jointly legally responsible for the exercise of power.

10. Effective opposition can help the government to avoid mistakes – or swiftly correct them – therebyimproving governance outcomes. So, the existence of an effective parliamentary opposition able to scrutinisethe policy of a governing majority is a visible symbol of the salvation of State political order and parliamentitself.

11. The Parameters on the Relationship between the Parliamentary Majority and the Opposition in aDemocracy: a checklist (“Checklist”) is the result of a long and careful work carried out by the EuropeanCommission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) which took its origin in Resolution 1601 (2008)“Procedural guidelines on the rights and responsibilities of the opposition in a democratic parliament” of theAssembly. The Venice Commission concluded that it is important to explore the ways and means by which therole of the parliamentary opposition can be formally better regulated and protected and that it is a worthyattempt to introduce soft regulations in an area which is essential for the proper functioning of parliamentarydemocracy. The use of the Checklist should be widely promoted amongst national parliaments, and theAssembly should contribute to this effort, directly and through its political groups.

12. In light of these considerations, the Assembly:

12.1. welcomes the elaboration of the Venice Commission Checklist on Parameters on theRelationship between the Parliamentary Majority and the Opposition in a Democracy: a Checklist, andendorses the Checklist as adopted;

12.2. disseminates and recommends the Checklist to the parliaments of the Council of Europemember and observer States, as well as to the parliaments enjoying observer or partner for democracystatus with the Assembly;

12.3. encourages member States to ensure that their democratic mechanisms are given politicallegitimacy through integrity, as trust in parliaments shapes both the stability and quality of democracy;only together can parliamentary majority and opposition create inclusive, prosperous and sustainablesocieties;

12.4. invites the parliaments of the member States of the Council of Europe to promote the Checklistand to take it into account when revising the relevant national rules or developing best practices;

12.5. encourages the parliaments of the member States of the Council of Europe to enter intodialogue about how to improve the existing national rules on the relationship between the parliamentarymajority and the opposition in a democracy;

13. As regards its own activities, the Assembly resolves to take into account the Checklist in its monitoringwork. It also resolves to play a greater role in promoting the Checklist by:

13.1. inviting its political groups to revise their statutory rules and rules of procedure, including provisions specifying the procedure and requirements for, and consequences of, switches in political affiliation as well as the suspension, expulsion or resignation of members;

13.2. encouraging its political groups to enhance discussions on how to improve the relationship between the parliamentary majority and the opposition in a democracy;

13.3. holding debates on how to develop the legal, including the soft law, environment and the best practices determining the relationship between the parliamentary majority and the opposition in a democracy;

13.4. stepping up interparliamentary co-operation activities addressing the improvement of the relationship between the parliamentary majority and the opposition in a democracy;

13.5. continuing to review, in co-operation with the Venice Commission, the Checklist and the issues raised in it, with a view to developing it further if required.

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