21. The Assembly deplores the fact that despite the imposition of an unprecedented sanctions regime,some of the Russian Federation’s trading partners continue to enable it to gain access to westerntechnologies and capital, allowing it to manufacture cruise missiles and drones that are used indiscriminatelyto attack Ukrainian cities, residential areas, hospitals and critical infrastructures. By way of example, theAssembly is concerned about the sharp increase in the import of microchips by Kazakhstan accompanied bya similar rise of exports of microchips from Kazakhstan to the Russian Federation. It is equally alarmed by thelarge quantities of crude oil being exported from the Russian Federation to India and then sold onwards to theWest.

22. The Assembly further condemns States that continue to support the Russian disinformation campaign,in particular by justifying its manifestly unlawful war of aggression on Ukraine, spread at various internationalfora, including the United Nations General Assembly and Human Rights Council, in particular Belarus, Iran,Cuba, North Korea, Venezuela, as well as others, thus undermining democracy worldwide.

23. At the same time, the Assembly welcomes reports that banks in Armenia, Kazakhstan and Hong Konghave begun refusing payments from Russian companies for electronics delivered to the Russian Federation. Itencourages all States and financial institutions to closely monitor all transactions with Russian entities toensure the effectiveness of the sanctioning mechanism.

24. The Assembly welcomes the approval on 12 March 2024 of a new European Union Directive tostrengthen the enforcement of European Union sanctions across member States by criminalising the violationand circumvention of sanctions. It also welcomes the recent inclusion of dozens of individuals involved in thepersecution of Alexei Navalny in the list of human rights violators sanctioned under the European Unionhuman rights sanctions regime, proposed now to be renamed after Alexei Navalny.

25. The Assembly considers that further restrictions are necessary to prevent the Russian economy fromsustaining the war against Ukraine. In particular, the Assembly notes that the Russian crude oil price capsanctions have had limited effect. Lack of sufficient control and deterrence mechanisms has permitted theRussian Federation to mitigate the effects of the sanctions, in particular by using a fleet of “shadow” tankersand because the price cap on Russian crude oil is still set at a too high a level.

26. The Assembly therefore:

26.1. urges the Russian Federation to:

26.1.1. allow an independent and transparent international investigation into Alexei Navalny’s death, including through an international commission of inquiry, which could be established by United Nations bodies or other international organisations;

26.1.2. cease persecuting family members, associates and supporters of Alexei Navalny in the Russian Federation and abroad;

26.1.3. release all prisoners currently detained in the Russian Federation for the purpose of silencing them and deterring other critics of the regime from protesting or speaking out;

26.2. calls on the European Union and all States having Magnitsky-type targeted sanctions laws to include in their sanctions lists the persons directly responsible for, and participating in, the persecution, ill-treatment and death of Alexei Navalny and invites all States that have not yet adopted such laws to do so without further delay;

26.3. calls on all States to ensure that the Russian Federation is held accountable for its systemic use of torture and other forms of ill-treatment to which Mr Navalny and thousands of other prisoners in the Russian Federation, including Ukrainian prisoners of war, have been subjected, by having recourse to the dispute settlement mechanism stipulated in Article 30 (1) of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment;

26.4. calls on all States to put pressure on the Russian Federation to allow independent international bodies to monitor the reported political prisoners' state of health and conditions of detention, pending their release or re-examination of their cases;

26.5. encourages member and observer States of the Council of Europe to pursue prisoner exchanges in order to obtain the release of political prisoners in the Russian Federation and Belarus, prioritising Vladimir Kara-Murza and others who have serious health conditions (noting in particular the potential role of Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America);

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