26.6. reiterates its call to set up an international mechanism to compensate the victims of the Russian aggression against Ukraine, to which frozen Russian assets should be promptly transferred, and to set up a special international tribunal to investigate and prosecute the political and military leadership of the Russian Federation for the crime of aggression against Ukraine.

26.7. calls on the European Union and the G7 group to further strengthen the sanctions regime against the Russian Federation, a State sponsor of terrorism, in particular by:

26.7.1. significantly strengthening the sanctions regime by lowering the oil and gas price cap, considering that the revenue from oil and gas exports is still a significant source of income for the Russian State budget;

26.7.2. imposing secondary sanctions on States, natural and legal persons that knowingly enable the Russian Federation to evade the full effects of sanctions imposed on its economy, including by exporting technology, munitions, dual-use goods for military use, and other resources used by the Russian Federation to sustain its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine;

26.7.3. setting up a Register of States, natural and legal persons aiding and abetting the Russian Federation in evading sanctions, including by enabling it to obtain dual-use goods for military use;

26.7.4. enforcing the existing mandatory “oil spill insurance” requirements for all tankers passing through their waters to promote compliance with the price cap sanctions and protect the environment from oil spills by ageing and insufficiently insured tankers;

26.7.5. cutting off any services provided to the Russian oil and gas industry in order to restrict its future liquefied natural gas production and increase the costs of oil extraction in the Russian Federation;

26.7.6. imposing sanctions on the Moscow Exchange as well as Rosatom – a State-owned nuclear energy monopoly that has taken control of Europe’s largest nuclear plant in Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia region, using this as a tool of blackmail against Europe by raising the threat of nuclear disaster;

26.7.7. emphasising that under international humanitarian law, the Russian oil refineries could be considered legitimate targets of military attacks;

26.8. calls on the United States of America – a Council of Europe observer State – to ensure that the Senate’s foreign aid bill, which includes military aid for Ukraine, is put to a vote without further delay or otherwise to authorise the delivery of the necessary military and other aid for Ukraine as soon as possible;

26.9. encourages the Council of Europe member and observer States to share amongst themselves all intelligence pertaining to the Russian Federation’s interference in electoral processes, including its disinformation campaigns, in order to identify and prevent further such practices;

26.10. calls on the Council of Europe member and observer States and the European Union to strengthen the effects of Resolution 2519 (2023) by formally recognising Vladimir Putin’s illegitimacy as President of the Russian Federation;

26.11. calls on the Council of Europe member States who are not members of the European Union to align themselves with sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation and its allies under the European Union human rights sanctions regime;

26.12. calls on the Council of Europe member and observer States, the European Union and the United Nations to draw attention to the numerous violations of human rights and the rights of peoples to the detriment of the colonised indigenous peoples of the Russian Federation;

26.13. calls on all States to apply to Vladimir Putin’s regime the existing anti-money laundering legislation aimed at combating organised crime and the financing of terrorism, to identify any private or legal persons that can be classified as enablers and impose harsh penalties thereon, including the confiscation of assets; and in particular to adopt, where lacking, and apply legislation permitting non-conviction based confiscation of illegal assets, with a reversal of the burden of proof, as recommended by the Assembly in Resolution 2218 (2018);

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